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ABSTRACT 
 
WORKERS OF THE EREĞLİ-ZONGULDAK COAL BASIN, 1848-1922 
Aytekin, Erden Attila 
M.A., Department of History 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. S. Akşin Somel 
 
July 2001 
 
 
This thesis focuses on the workers in Ereğli-Zonguldak coal basin, the most important 
mining region in the Ottoman Empire. The operation in the basin started in 1848, and 
in the course of the three quarter-centuries that passed until 1922, considerable 
transformations in terms of technology, administrative structure, capital composition 
etc. have taken place in the basin. These transformations had important consequences 
for the working and living conditions of the workers, and towards the end of the 
period in question, the workers themselves emerged as innegligible actors and began 
to influence the developments in the basin. 
The thesis is basically organised around two lines of investigation. The first 
line is the wages of workers. The development of the wages of different categories of 
workers is investigated for the period of 1875-1922, for which data exists, and the 
period of 1905-11 and the year 1922 are paid special attention. Leaving aside the 
apparent erosion during the war years, it could be observed that the real wages in the 
basin presented a stable pattern. On the other hand, this erosion was not distributed 
evenly; different categories of workers were affected to different extents. The thesis 
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also discusses the impact of the Strikes of 1908, which broke out in the basin as did 
throughout the empire. The cuts and deductions imposed on wages under different 
names are also discussed under a separate heading. 
The second line of investigation is the industrial accidents that have taken 
place in the mines. The accidents that occurred in the years 1909-10 are discussed in 
detail and the reactions of different people, groups and institutions including the state 
and the workers, to these accidents are analysed. The state’s response has been 
ambivalent and at times contradictory, in accordance with the nature of Ottoman state 
of the time and the structural and conjectural conditions in which it found itself. The 
response of the workers has manifested itself in strikes. 
 
Keywords: Mine Workers, Ereğli-Zonguldak Coal Basin, Ottoman Working Class, 
Wages, Industrial Accidents 
 
 
 
 v 
 
 
ÖZET 
 
EREĞLİ-ZONGULDAK KÖMÜR HAVZASI İŞÇİLERİ, 1848-1922 
Aytekin, Erden Attila 
Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd.Doç.Dr. S. Akşin Somel 
 
Temmuz 2001 
 
Bu tez, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun en önemli madencilik bölgesi olan Ereğli-
Zonguldak kömür havzasındaki işçileri konu almaktadır. Havza 1848 yılında 
işletilmeye başlanmış ve 1922 yılına kadar geçen üç çeyrek yüzyıllık süreçte 
teknoloji, idari yapı, sermaye kompozisyonu vs. bakımlardan hatırı sayılır dönüşümler 
yaşamıştır. Bu dönüşümlerin havzada çalışan işçilerin çalışma ve hayat şartları 
bakımından önemli sonuçları olmuş, incelenen dönemin sonuna doğru işçiler de 
kayda değer aktörler olarak olayların gidişini etkilemeye başlamışlardır. 
Çalışma esasen iki temel hat üzerine kurulmuştur. İlk hat, havzadaki işçi 
ücretleridir. Farklı kategorilerdeki işçi ücretlerinin gelişimi verilerin mevcut olduğu 
1875-1922 yılları arası dönemde incelenmekte, 1905-11 dönemine ve 1922 yılına özel 
bir vurgu yapılmaktadır. Buna göre, savaş yıllarında yaşanan belirgin aşınmayı 
dışarıda bırakırsak, gerçek ücretler istikrarlı bir nitelik arz etmiştir. Savaş yıllarında 
görülen erozyon da işçiler arasında eşit dağılmamış, farklı işçi kategorileri bundan 
farklı oranlarda etkilenmişlerdir. Tezde ayrıca, tüm imparatorlukta olduğu gibi 
havzada da meydana gelen 1908 Grevleri’nin ücretler üzerindeki etkisi de 
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tartışılmaktadır. Ücretler üzerinde çeşitli adlar altında yapılan kesintiler de ayrı bir 
başlık altında ele alınmaktadır. 
Üzerinde durulan ikinci konu havzadaki ocaklarda yaşanan iş kazalarıdır. 
1909-10 yılında vuku bulan kazalar ayrıntılı biçimde ele alınmakta, başta devlet ve 
işçiler olmak üzere, çeşitli kişi, grup ve kurumların kazalara verdikleri tepkiler 
tartışılmaktadır. Kazalar devletin tepkisi, o dönem Osmanlı devletinin niteliğine ve 
içinde bulunduğu yapısal ve konjonktürel koşullara uygun olarak, çokbiçimli ve yer 
yer çelişkili olmuştur. İşçilerin kazalara tepkisiyse greve gitmek biçiminde tezahür 
etmiştir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Maden İşçileri, Ereğli-Zonguldak Kömür Havzası, Osmanlı İşçi 
Sınıfı, Ücretler, İş Kazaları 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Ottoman labour history is one of the most underdeveloped and neglected areas of 
the Ottoman social history. One can observe that in this area even the most basic 
and essential studies still remain uncarried. The practitioners of Ottoman labour 
history attribute this poor condition of the field to a number of factors and the 
problem of the lack of sources is often held responsible. It is no doubt that the 
scarcity of primary material to be used in historical studies is not the only serious 
problem with which the Ottoman labour historians confront; yet, it constitutes a 
great obstacle for the advancement of our state of knowledge concerning the 
Ottoman workers. 
The study of the workers of Ereğli-Zonguldak coal basin also shared this 
backward state of the Ottoman labour historiography; presently, what we know 
about these workers is much less extensive than what we do not. Indeed, due to a 
number of factors, the workers of the coal basin may constitute a highly interesting 
and promising subject matter for Ottoman labour studies. First, there was a high 
degree of labour concentration in the basin. At the turn of the century, there were 
approximately ten thousand workers in this relatively small region. Moreover, the 
heavy dependence of mining industry on transportation via railways required a 
significant population of railway workers and thereby further increased the density 
of labourers. Secondly, the mine workers, rather justifiably, have been given a 
special place in labour historiography in general. Among other things, the 
 2 
extraordinary hardship of the working conditions of these workers and their 
apparent militancy in terms of struggle and resistance have made them one of the 
foci of working-class histories. Thirdly, all of the workers of the Ereğli-Zonguldak 
coal basin were not permanent workers. A significant proportion of the labour force 
consisted of rotational workers who continued to spend half of their working times 
in agriculture and thus did not solely depend on income from mine labour. 
Fourthly, there was mükellefiyet, the practice of forced labour imposed by the 
government as a solution to the acute problem of labour scarcity. The wide 
application of this practice indicates that the forms of labour other than free labour 
existed in the basin, which adds another dimension to the complexity of studying 
the workers of this mining region. 
These points, among others, depict the significance of the history of these 
labourers for the Ottoman labour history. On the other hand, the history of the coal 
basin is of high importance for Ottoman history in general. For one, the basin 
became one of the most important concentration areas of foreign capital in the 
Empire. The French company, which was granted the right to exploit mines in the 
region, represented the biggest foreign investment in mining sector1 and became 
the second largest employer throughout the Empire2. 
The history of the basin started in 1848, when the revenues of the mines 
were allocated to a religious foundation3. From 1848 to 1865, the basin was 
administered by Hazine-i Hassa (Privy Purse). The land on which rich coal 
                                                          
1 Vedat Eldem, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun İktisadi Şartları Hakkında Bir Tetkik (Ankara: TTK, 
1994), p.46. 
2 Ibid., p.141. 
3 Sina Çıladır points out the oddity in dedicating the revenues of such a strategic mine to charity: 
Zonguldak Havzasında İşçi Hareketlerinin Tarihi 1848/1940 (Ankara: Yeraltı Maden-İş, 1977), p. 
34. 
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reserves lied was state-owned land4 and the ownership structure and status of land 
had, as in other parts of the world, an influence on the development of production 
relations. In late-nineteenth century Bolivia, for example, landed estates were 
combined with mines, basically as a solution to labour scarcity and the problems of 
labour discipline5. In European states such as Spain, Portugal, Italy and 
Luxemburg, landownership was so fragmented that capital could not flow freely 
through lands, and this led to nationalisation in these countries. By contrast, in 
Britain, the highly concentrated nature of mining lands did not hinder the 
development of mining and nationalisation was delayed until 19386. It is possible 
that the absence of landed property in the Ereğli-Zonguldak coal basin had a 
similar impact on the development of mining. It may have enabled the 
concentration of production in a few hands before the French company and the 
actual monopolisation of the basin by the company afterwards. The fact that the 
nationalisation of the coal basin did not occur before 1940 may also have had a 
relation to this. Secondly, due to the absence of private property of mining land and 
due to the fact that the pits were operated with concessions of the government, the 
mine operators emerged as both capitalist entrepreneurs and mültezims 
simultaneously. Similar to the situation in Latin American mining, where 
“employers tried to tie their workers through dept or coercive measures”7, the 
relation between operators and workers in the coal basin was rather complex and 
                                                          
4 The provisions of the Arazi Kanunnamesi (Land Law) of 1858, which formally established private 
ownership of land, did not apply to the basin. See Ali Özeken, Türkiye Kömür Ekonomisi Tarihi, 
Birinci Kısım (İstanbul: İ.Ü. İktisat Fakültesi, 1955), p.9-10. 
5 Erick D. Langer, “The Barriers to Proletarianization: Bolivian Mine Labour, 1826-1918”, 
International Review of Social History, vol.41 (1996), 27-51, pp.39-41. 
6 Ben Fine, The Coal Question: Political Economy and Industrial Change from the Nineteenth 
Century to the Present Day (London: Routledge, 1990), pp.38-41. 
7 Langer, “Bolivian Mine Labour”, pp.33-4. 
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involved many dimensions, some of them being in ‘contradiction’ with modern 
capitalist relations of production8. 
The mining activity in the basin during the Hazine-i Hassa period was 
characterised by insufficient capitalisation, poor technology and low and unstable 
level of production. This tended to change after the basin was left to the Naval 
Ministry in 1865. But the real change started in 1882, when the ministry’s 
monopoly on the purchase of coal was lifted. From 1880s onwards, big capital 
invested in the region, big companies were formed, and the annual production 
substantially increased. Another major transformation began with the entrance of 
the French Ereğli Şirket-i Osmaniyesi to the basin. The company initiated a process 
that was characterised by the more rational organisation of production, substantial 
investments in infrastructure, the liquidation of small capital and monopolisation. 
The rule of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) after 1908 also 
had its influence on the development of the basin. Within a short span of time, the 
CUP government replaced the military and ‘Hamidian’ high and middle 
bureaucrats of the basin with civilian personnel linked to Union and Progress. 
Moreover, it attempted to establish a closer and firmer control on the basin. 
However, under pressure from foreign capital, it had to consent to policies that 
furthered the position of foreign companies in the basin. 
All of these changes in the structure, organisation and administration of the 
coal basin more or less affected the lives of thousands of workers working and 
living in the region. The conditions under which the labourers worked during the 
Hazine-i Hassa administration were extremely unhealthy and unsafe. The workers 
                                                          
8 See Çıladır, Zonguldak Havzası, pp.31-2. 
 5 
worked ‘from dawn to sunset’ and without any regulations governing the work, or 
without any medical service. More often than not, wages were paid in kind. 
It is no doubt that the Naval Ministry administration and particularly the so-
called ‘Dilaver Paşa Regulation’ represented an improvement for the workers. The 
protection provided by the regulation in the form of regular pay schedules, 
regulated work hours, medical care etc. is in itself a major event for the history of 
the workers of the coal basin. On the other hand, it is not fully known to what 
extent the provisions of this one-hundred-article regulation were implemented. At 
least, the problem of the payment of wages on time continued. 
Although the entrance of the French company to the basin brought about a 
progress in terms of technology and infrastructure, it is hardly possible to say that 
this found reflection in the working and living conditions of workers. Except a 
brief period of relatively improvement (between 1880s, when the flow of big 
capital brought about a high demand for labour, and 1906, when the ban on hiring 
workers from outside the region was lifted), the plight of workers perpetuated. A 
strong indicator of the persistence of unsafe working conditions is the industrial 
accidents, which seemed not to be affected from the increase in the big investments 
and improvement in infrastructural facilities in the basin. 
 
1.1 Problems to be Investigated 
As -hopefully- clear from the above presentation of the history of the basin and its 
workers during the Ottoman period, there are a number of problems that could and 
should be investigated in this history. For example, in the basin, there were 
rotational workers, mostly local people, and permanent workers, mostly outsiders. 
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There were also skilled and unskilled ones. What was the relationship between 
them? What was the role of these differences in promoting or hindering a sense of 
solidarity among them?9 What was the effect of the money pumped by the 
rotational workers’ wages into the peasant economy of the region? What were the 
consequences, in terms of class formation, of the ‘semi-proletarian’ nature of these 
workers? How did the wages develop in the course of the years in question? What 
was the level of the standard of living of the workers? Was it possible to observe a 
difference in workers’ attitudes towards foreign and Ottoman mine operators? 
What were the strategies and tactics of foreign capital in the basin? What were the 
state policies towards the basin in general, towards the workers, foreign firms and 
local firms in particular? Were the policies of CUP substantially different from 
those of the ancien régime? What was the frequency of the accidents and which 
measures were taken by the operators and the state to avoid them? What was the 
labour’s reaction to those accidents?  
The number of these questions could be easily increased. On the other hand, 
due to certain limitations, in this thesis, only a few of them is thoroughly and 
systematically discussed. Some of them are touched upon briefly and some are 
simply ignored. Yet, the focus is on the points that seem to be representative and 
that promise to extent our knowledge about the workers of the basin more than the 
others.  
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Quataert, Donald, “Zonguldak Maden İşçilerinin Hayatı, 1870-1920”, Toplum ve Bilim, no.83 
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1.2 The Sources 
There are not too many works on the history of the coal basin in the Ottoman 
period and I tried to make intensive use of those that exist and were of reach to me. 
As primary sources, I used the archival sources located in Zonguldak. These 
sources, which were uncovered by coincidence, constitute, in Quataert and Özbek’s 
words, the finest assemblage of materials on Ottoman labour history yet 
uncovered10. Thus, it seems that the importance of these archival materials for the 
Ottoman labour history is comparable to that of the region for the late Ottoman 
economy. Among the thousands of documents, there are those that relate to the 
Republican period but the majority pertains to the Ottoman era. The documents that 
concern the Ottoman era are now found in three locations: Zonguldak Karaelmas 
University, TTK Eğitim Dairesi and in private hands11. Among the 31 types and 
over 200 hundred pieces of registers in Karaelmas University, I worked on a 
portion of them. Indeed, these registers deserve years of meticulous study by 
numerous scholars. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of five chapters, including the introductory and the concluding 
ones. Chapter 2, “A Brief History of the Coal Basin”, is divided into two parts. In 
the first part, major developments and policy changes in the coal basin is presented 
briefly. In the second part, these developments and changes are discussed and 
                                                                                                                                                                 
(1999/2000), 80-91, p.87. 
10 Donald Quataert and Nadir Özbek “The Ereğli-Zonguldak Coal Mines: A Catalog of Archival Documents”, The Turkish Studies 
Association Bulletin, vol.23, no. 1 (1999), 55-67. 
11 For a detailed description and classification of these documents see Ibid.  
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interpreted from the point of view of labour. Developments that specifically 
concern the workers are also mentioned and discussed. Chapter 3 is devoted to the 
wages in the basin. After a brief section on Ottoman wages in general, wages in the 
basin are discussed in the context of certain overlapping time periods, namely 
1905-11, circa 1922, 1911-22 and 1875-22. The impact of the Strikes of 1908 on 
Ottoman wages in general and on wages in the basin in particular is also 
interpreted. The second part of Chapter 3 relates to different forms of deductions 
and cuts imposed on worker’s wages. Chapter 4 is devoted to the industrial 
accidents that took place in the basin. Here, the focus is a period of six months that 
extend from the last months of 1909 to the first months of 1910. In the light of the 
accident records of this period, various state organs’, the company’s, and the 
workers' reaction to the accidents are interpreted. The thesis, needless to say, ends 
with a concluding chapter in which the most significant conclusions that come out 
of individual chapters are summarised and combined. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COAL BASIN 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The Ereğli-Zonguldak coal basin and its inhabitants experienced major 
transformations in the course of the 19th century. The situation in the early 20th 
century was substantially different from that in the 1830s, when the existence of 
coal is allegedly noticed for the first time. During this period, the basin witnessed 
different managements, fluctuations in the production, the entry and exit of national 
and foreign capitals, a number of mining and labour regulations put into force, 
several incidents and massive strikes. Therefore, before going into detail about the 
workers’ working and living conditions, it is necessary to review these changes as a 
background to the period that constitutes my major focus of interest. Here, it should 
be noted that different periodisation schemes could be used for examining the 
history of the coal basin. The most frequent scheme used by researchers up to now 
has been one that periodises it according to the state organ in charge of the control 
of the mines. I will use this periodisation for the sake of convenience and bear in 
mind that such a periodisation scheme may obscure more than it reveals. 
After that, the developments in the conditions of the mineworkers are 
presented briefly and in doing this, a different periodisation used. The so-called 
Dilaver Paşa regulations and the strikes of 1908 are considered as historical 
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landmarks concerning the workers of the basin and their situation is discussed in 
three sections: until the regulation, between the regulation and the strikes, and 
during and after the strikes. 
 
2.2 The Historical Development of the Basin 
In this section, the historical development of the coal basin is examined under four 
major headings: Hazine-i Hassa period, Naval Ministry period, the period after the 
entrance of the Ereğli company into the basin (this includes the post-revolutionary 
Ottoman policy towards the basin) and the years of war and interregnum. 
 
2.2.1 The Coal Basin as Vakıf: the Hazine-i Hassa Period, 1848-1865 
According to the popular wisdom, a man named Uzun Mehmet who took a sack of 
coal to the capital and was rewarded first found the coal in the region. Indeed, there 
is no evidence to support this argument12 and it seems that it is hardly anything 
more than a legend. 
The land on which the rich coal deposits lied was in the status of miri (state-
owned) land and in 1848, Sultan Abdülmecid endowed the revenues of the mines 
to a vakıf (foundation) and the revenues started to be used for religious purposes13. 
The task of the Hazine-i Hassa (Privy Purse) management was to collect the 
revenue deriving from the sources called mukataas (tax-farming units) and to 
supervise the mining operations of the mültezims (tax-farmers) in the basin14. In the 
same year, Hazine-i Hassa transferred the right to exploit the mines to Kömür 
                                                          
12 Erol Çatma, Asker İşçiler (İstanbul: Ceylan, 1998), p.69. 
13 For some examples of these religious purposes see Kadir Tuncer, Tarihten Günümüze 
Zonguldak’ta İşçi Sınıfının Durumu. “Kumpanyalar Dönemine Geri Dönüş” (İstanbul: Göçebe, 
1998), p.30. 
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Kumpanyası, established by the bankers of Galata, for an annual payment of 30,000 
piasters15. Although the Hazine-i Hassa management took the right of operation of 
the mines back from this company in 1851 and assigned a director to the basin16, 
many of the operators remained the creditors of the Ottoman government. 
During the Hazine-i Hassa period, the mining in the region was 
characterised by production through extremely primitive methods. Mainly due to 
the lack of investment on the part of the operators of the mines, contemporary coal 
mining technology could not be introduced into the basin. The amount of 
production, therefore, remained considerably low and showed no sign of recovery 
through the period. One exception to this could be the English company that was 
granted the right of operation of the mines during the Crimean War (1854-56). 
Despite the briefness of the period, the company made some steps towards 
improving the infrastructure of the coal mining17. 
During the Hazine-i Hassa period, the relations of production were in an 
underdeveloped state. The operators of the pits were both capitalist entrepreneurs 
and mültezims (tax-farmers). Moreover, it is known that the state occasionally 
granted the right of collecting the taxes of nearby villages to mine operators in 
exchange for the coal it took from them18. Thus, the relation between the workers 
and the operators was something more than a relation between free labour and 
capitalists. More of then not, the mine operator was simultaneously a capitalist who 
exploited the workers’ surplus labour, a tax collector who was in charge of 
                                                                                                                                                                 
14 Vedat Eldem, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun İktisadi Şartları Hakkında Bir Tetkik (Ankara: TTK, 
1994), p.47. 
15 Tuncer, Tarihten Günümüze, p.28. 
16 Çatma, Asker İşçiler, p.70. 
17 Tuncer, Tarihten Günümüze, p.29. 
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collecting the agrarian taxes and a usurer who lent money to the workers with high 
interest rates. The outcome of this complex set of relationships in the basin was 
frequent payments in kind and different forms of forced labour19. 
 
2.2.2 The Coal Basin under Bahriye Nezareti, 1865-1908 
Having seen the low production level and the disorganisation in the basin, the 
Ottoman government placed the Ereğli-Zonguldak coalmines under the authority of 
the Bahriye Nezareti (Naval Ministry) in 1865. This decision was taken because the 
coal produced in the basin was mainly used by the ships of the Ottoman navy and 
the navy was in a process of reconstruction and enlargement20. The commerce of 
coal was regulated according to a yed-i vahid (monopoly) system; “[u]ntil 1882, the 
Ministry of the Navy had the sole right to purchase, at government-determined 
prices, coal produced at Ereğli.”21 
Although mining was carried out with relatively better infrastructure and 
organisation in this period, the management of Naval Ministry was not successful 
enough either. The amount of total production remained highly unstable. For 
example, while the production was 142,000 tons in 1877, it decreased to only 
56,000 tons in 188022. This unstable nature and low level of production was 
combined with pressures both from foreign capital to ensure concessions and from 
                                                                                                                                                                 
18 Sina Çıladır, Zonguldak Havzasında İşçi Hareketlerinin Tarihi 1848/1940 (Ankara: Yeraltı 
Maden-İş, 1977), p.31. 
19 A similar situation could be observed in nineteenth-century Latin America. There, the employers 
responded to labour scarcity by trying “to tie workers to their enterprises through dept or coercive 
measures.” Moreover, particularly in early and mid-nineteenth century, payment in kind was very 
frequent. Erick. D. Langer, “The Barriers to Proletarianization: Bolivian Mine Labour, 1826-1918”, 
International Review of Social History, vol.41 (1996), 27-51, pp.33-4 and 42. 
20 Towards the end of the reign of Abdülaziz, Ottoman navy became known as the third largest navy 
of its time; Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi, vol. VII (Ankara: TTK, 1983), p.191. 
21 Donald Quataert, Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881-
1908. Reactions to European Economic Penetration (New York, NYU Press, 1983), p.45. 
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Ottoman capital aiming to abolish Naval Ministry’s monopoly in purchasing the 
coal. These pressures led the government to make an important decision in 1882. 
Rather than giving a concession to a French company, which was trying, for some 
time, to get one, the Ottoman government chose to abolish the Naval Ministry’s 
purchasing monopoly as an inducement to existing mine operators23. The 1882 
decision was followed by policies designed to support private Ottoman capital in 
the basin; these policies were in the form of tax reductions, reductions in export 
duties and customs duties exemptions24. Both the decision and the subsequent 
policies brought about a considerable change in the capital structure of the basin. 
From 1880s onwards, relatively big capital invested in the mines; big-scale 
Ottoman companies such as İnsaniye, İnamiye, Eseyan-Karamanyan and Gürcü 
companies were formed25. The production substantially increased. The figure of 
98,000 tons in 1881 rose to 158,000 in 1886 and averaged around 150,000 tons for 
several years26. 
Another point that should be of concern is the condition of the ownership of 
mines in the basin before the Ereğli Company. After the entrance of big capital in 
the 1880s, small-scale enterprises were liquidated. This brought about a high 
concentration in the ownership; the biggest four firms, namely the Karamanyan, 
Gürcü, Halaçyan and Gregoviç companies had a share of ¾ over total production 
                                                                                                                                                                 
22 Ibid., pp.45-6. 
23 Ibid., p.46. 
24 Ibid., p.47. 
25 Ahmet Naim quoted in Çıladır, Zonguldak Havzası, p.59. 
26 Ibid., p.47. Although the figures given by Eldem is different (e.g. 1886=100,000 tons), they also 
indicate a substantial rise: Eldem, Tetkik, p.50. 
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around 189327. It is no surprise that this highly concentrated structure of ownership 
continued during the domination of the Ereğli Company as well. 
The Naval Ministry administration could be considered as the beginnings of 
modern capitalist production in the basin. The authority of this ministry continued 
formally until 1908; yet, the concession given to the Ereğli Company was so 
important that it deserves to be examined under a separate heading. 
 
2.2.3 French Capital Enters the Region: the Ereğli Company 
The concession to exploit the Ereğli coal mines given to the Sociéte d’Heraclée 
(Ereğli Şirket-i Osmaniyesi / Ereğli Company) in 1896 is a major event for fin de 
siécle Ottoman history. For, “[t]his became the most important single venture of 
foreign capital in the Ottoman Empire to exploit mineral sources until the 
Mesopotamian oil fields were opened up.”28 Ereğli Company was really a major 
foreign investment in the Empire. For the mining sector, its investment capital of 
186,000,000 piasters was incomparable to that of other companies, the biggest of 
which, the French Balya-Karaaydın company, had an investment capital of 
49,200,000 piasters29. It was also very large in terms of the number of people it 
employed. Among all national or foreign firms in the empire, with its over 5,000 
personnel, it was surpassed only by the Tütün Rejisi (Tobacco Régie), which 
employed approximately 14,000 people30. The French government also attached 
                                                          
27 Quataert, Disintegration, pp.47-8. 
28 Ibid., p.41. 
29 Eldem, Tetkik, p.46. 
30 Ibid., p.141. 
 15
great importance to the company; at the time, “The French Ambassador wrote 
glowingly of the French colony being established at Zonguldak”31. 
The company undertook major infrastructural activity in the region, 
including the construction of a coal washing factory, a repairs workshop, a coke 
and briquette factory and most importantly, the development of the Zonguldak 
port32. These improvements, and the railway construction undertaken by the 
Ottoman government quickly increased production. The company production rose 
rapidly and averaged over 500,000 tons. In the first years after the turn of the 
century, the Ereğli company found itself in fierce competition with the other big 
firms in the basin, especially the Sarıcazadeler company, which was established by 
Ragıp Paşa from Abdülhamid’s court33. In general, the French company emerged 
triumphant from this competition. It also acquired or took under its control 
abandoned pits, pits run by individual operators and those operated by the state. 
The company also gained an almost monopoly position. In 1902 and 1907, it 
accounted for 79 and 77 percent of the total coal output of the basin, respectively34. 
By 1909, in Çatalağzı region, for example, all the mines were operated by the 
company35. Because of this ‘dominant position’ of the company, the increase in the 
                                                          
31 Quataert, Disintegration, p.49. 
32 Çıladır, Zonguldak Havzası, p.80. 
33 Ibid., p.83. Ragıp Paşa had other investments in the mining sector. From 1899 through 1903, at 
the expense of a British company, he got the concession to exploit the chromium mines of  Dağardı 
and Harmancık, the latter being the most important reserves throughout the Empire; see Orhan 
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34 Quataert, Disintegration, p.49. On the other hand, according to official mine statistics, the share of 
Ottoman Turkish, Ottoman non-Turkish and foreign operators in the coal production of the years 
1908-11was as follows: Turkish 21,35 %, non-Turkish 26,34 %, foreign 52,01 %: Gündüz Ökçün, 
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that were formally operated by an Ottoman subject were, in reality, controlled by the Ereğli 
company. Thus, the real figures of the amount of coal extracted by foreign operators should be 
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35 Karaelmas University Archives (KÜA), no.40 (Evrak Defteri), p. 96. 
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production of the company found direct reflection in the overall production of the 
basin. In 1907/8, with a revenue of 42,962,000 piasters, the region became the most 
important mining region of the empire. Another figure shows that coal had a share 
of 44.4 percent over the total revenues obtained from mining36. 
According to Donald Quataert, despite the major concession it had granted 
in 1896, the Ottoman government was hardly friendly towards the company. It 
tried to limit further involvement of foreign capital in the mines via legislations, 
regulations and other means, and pursued policies designed to support Ottoman 
capital in the region vis-à-vis foreign capital. It is possible to argue that this 
ambivalent attitude reflects the contradictory situation in which the Ottoman 
government found itself. On the one hand, within the context of the integration into 
world capitalist system of the Empire, it could hardly resist the aspirations of 
foreign capital. On the other hand, it did not want to abandon its control over the 
country’s resources completely and used the means that were in its disposal to 
prevent such a development, particularly through the mine administration, which, 
under different names, was responsible for the whole basin. For example, when the 
Çatalağzı office, one of the branch offices of the mine administration, asked the 
central office to take a document of permission from the company in order to enter 
the mines of the company located in Çatalağzı, the central office responded that the 
mine administration has the unconditional right to enter and control the mines of 
the company whenever it considers necessary37. This correspondence is particularly 
important, since it indicates the confusion between local and central offices of the 
mine administration concerning their rights vis-à-vis the company. It should be also 
                                                          
36 Eldem, Tetkik, p.43. 
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recalled within this context that all the mines in Çatalağzı belonged to the Ereğli 
Company38. The mine administration also demanded that the maps and plans of 
particular mines operated by the company should be presented to the 
administration; it seems, however, that the company was reluctant in doing so. The 
administration again responded in a harsh tone, stating that the administration 
could ask for the maps and plans of the mines whenever it wants39. But it is 
understood that this problem between the company and the mine administration 
continued even after this statement of the latter40. The administration also shut 
down some of the mines of the company and again, the company tried to resist; we 
learn from a correspondence between the Zonguldak Kaymakamlığı that the seals 
put on one of the seams of the company was removed41, which means that the 
production in the seam was resumed without the permission of the administration. 
On the other hand, the relations between the company and the administration was 
not always, or as a whole, tense. For example, the Çatalağzı branch rented the 
buildings of the company and the two thus entered into a relationship of landlord-
tenant42. The same branch also proposed to employ a night-watchman in order to 
prevent the stealing of company’s coal stocks by the local population43. It may also 
be argued that the changing personal attitudes of high-level bureaucrats to the 
company contributed to the complexity of the company-administration relations. 
Hüseyin Fehmi (İmer), one of the directors of the mine administration, writes in his 
                                                                                                                                                                 
37 KÜA, no.40, p.100 (18 Teşrin-i Evvel 1325 / 31 October 1909). 
38 KÜA, no.40, p.96 (28 Teşrin-i Evvel 1325 / 10 November 1909). 
39 KÜA, no.40, p.131 (28 Teşrin-i Evvel 1325 / 10 November 1909). 
40 KÜA, no.40, p.104 (21 Kanun-ı Evvel 1325 / 4 December 1909). 
41 KÜA, no.40, p.132 (4 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 / 17 November 1909). 
42 KÝA, no.40, p.105 (10 Kanun-ı Sani 1325 / 23 January 1910). 
43 KÜA, no.40, p.102 (10 Teşrin-Sani 1325 / 23 November 1909). 
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memoirs that while his predecessor, Eşref Bey, had not been in good relations with 
the company, he got on well with the high-level officers of the company44. 
In addition to having unstable relations with the mine administration, the 
company was met with hostility from rival concessionaires and local capitalists as 
well. During the spring of 1909, the newly elected parliamentarians from the region 
heavily protested “against the ruination of Ottoman mine operators by the 
company.”45 The hostility of the deputies from the region may well be reflecting 
the ongoing struggle in the region between the French company and the Ottoman 
capitalists for control of the mines. 
Apart from the hostility of local mine operators to the company, it may be 
argued that there was a kind of popular hostility as well. The local population was 
hardly friendly towards the company. The company constantly faced robberies46, 
attacks on its mines47, illegal construction near its seams etc. For example, in five 
months’ time in the year of 1325 (1909-10), five incidents against its property were 
recorded. In a letter sent from one of the local branches to the centre of the 
administration, it is even argued that the daily loss of coal powder of the company 
due to theft is three to five tons48. I think that these incidents could be interpreted as 
more than ordinary crimes. Their high frequency and that no such incidents were 
                                                          
44 Kerim Yund (ed.), Seçkin Türk Ormancısı Hüseyin Fehmi İmer Hayatı Hatıraları (1871-1960) 
(İstanbul: Baha, 1973), pp.46-8. 
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46 See KÜA, no.40, p.71 (19 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 / 2 December 1909) and p.103 (19 Teşrin-i Sani 
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48 KÜA, no.40, p.102 (10 Teşrin-Sani 1325 / 23 November 1909). 
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seen against local capitalists urges one to consider these incidents as sings of 
hostility or dissent against the French capital in the region. 
 
2.2.4 The Ottoman Policy in the Basin in the Post-Revolutionary Era 
Although the policies of the Ottoman government during the Young Turk era are 
occasionally mentioned in other sections of this chapter, at this point, a few words 
about the general policy of the post-Revolutionary Ottoman government towards 
the coal basin would be appropriate. In this context, the attitude towards mine 
operators other than the French company should also be considered. For, although 
the company produced a significant part of the total output, the existence of other 
foreign and local capitals in the region is an innegligible fact. 
The Union and Progress government initiated a number of substantial 
administrative changes in the basin. The mines were taken out from the authority of 
Naval Ministry and put under first the Ministry of Public Works, then the Ministry 
of Commerce, Agriculture and Mines49. The mine administration’s name was 
converted from Maden-i Hümayun Nazırlığı (Department of Imperial Mines) to 
Maden Umum Müdürlüğü (General Directorate of Mines). Civil bureaucrats were 
assigned to the administrative and technical posts in the basin to replace the 
military officers attached to the Naval Ministry50. In 1910, Hüseyin Fehmi (İmer) 
from the Committee of Union of Progress was assigned as the general director and 
was granted a wide range of powers. Indeed, the archival sources also suggest that 
a comprehensive change in the personnel structure of the mine administration 
occurred after the Young Turk revolution. The Maaş Defteri (salary register) of 
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132551 (1909-10) includes information about the assignment dates of the personnel 
as well and it is striking to see that nearly all high and middle officials were 
assigned to their posts after July 1908. Moreover, it is also seen in this register that 
a number of employees who were removed from their offices were also expelled 
from civil service. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the Young Turk government 
almost completely removed the cadre of the ancien régime from the mine 
administration and replaced it with that of Union and Progress during the years 
1908-10. 
During the post-revolutionary era, the internal organisation of the mine 
administration was highly centralised. The local branches always had to ask for the 
approval of the centre even for the smallest construction work, smallest spending, 
employment of a single worker or granting their employees leaves of short periods. 
Every branch sent regular monthly detailed reports on spending and coal 
production of the sub-region under their responsibility52. One of the major goals of 
the government policy towards the coalmines was, needless to say, to increase 
production. According to mining regulations, the mines that were left idle for three 
months were considered abandoned53. Thus, the mine administration behaved 
accordingly. It was very keen on not allowing any stoppage on the operation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
50 Çıladır, Zonguldak Havzası, p.98.  
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mines or the transportation of coal, and if a problem occurred, it pressed the local 
offices to complete the necessary repairs swiftly54. 
The government’s desire to establish control over the operation of the mines 
also found its reflection in the attitude of the mine administration towards mine 
operators other than the French company. All mine operators were required to 
assign a director to each mine, who would be directly responsible for the whole 
affairs of the mine vis-à-vis the administration55. The mine administration was also 
concerned with the issues related to labour; it closely followed the actions of the 
mine operators concerning the payment of wages56, accommodation57 and 
workplace organisation58. On the other hand, as in the case of the Ereğli Company, 
the relations between the administration and other mine operators was complex and 
involved many dimensions. For instance, when assigned as the director of the mine 
administration on May 23rd, 1910, Hüseyin Fehmi (İmer) saw no problem in 
accepting the ‘kind invitation’ of the Gürcü company and making his journey from 
İstanbul to Kozlu in one of the company’s ships59. 
The changes in the formal hierarchical structure of the mine administration 
may have also had an influence on its policies towards the basin in general and the 
mine operators in particular. According to memoirs of Hüseyin Fehmi (İmer), when 
the Ministry of Forest and Mines attempted to assign a military officer to the head 
of basin’s mine administration around 1909-10, the mine operators of the region 
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heavily protested and demanded a non-military director, reminding the difficulties 
they had suffered under the military administration of the Naval Ministry60. 
In general, the policies of the CUP government concerning the basin was 
oriented towards a firmer control of the coal mines. It is possible to argue that these 
policies had an impact on the development of the basin after 1908. On the other 
hand, the foreign capital continued to dominate the region. The government 
cancelled the concessions granted to the Sarıcazade company, the biggest Ottoman 
company in the basin, and this resulted in its acquirement by a German coal mining 
giant61. The owner of the company, Ragıp Paşa, had acquired these concessions by 
virtue of his close relationship to Abdülhamit and thus this should be considered as 
a political decision on the part of the new régime. On March 5th, 1912, the Ereğli 
company was granted major concessions. Initially, the government had rejected the 
demands of the company in toto. Under pressure from the Ottoman Bank, however, 
it had to agree to the conditions imposed by the company and the parties signed an 
agreement. By this agreement, the company was freed from almost all of its 
liabilities to the Ottoman government (to link railways via tunnels, to pay the 
government’s share of 8 percent from the port’s income, to sell the coal of 
abandoned pits transferred to itself to the Ottoman state with a low price, to give 
for free the government’s share of 10 percent from the coal powder it produced 
etc.)62. Thus, despite its efforts, the CUP government’s desire to establish a firmer 
control over the mines failed and the situation even got worse, with the entrance of 
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a giant German enterprise into the basin and the advancement in the position of the 
French company vis-à-vis the Ottoman state. To conclude this section, it should be 
said that this interpretation of the policies of the CUP is in contradiction with that 
of Zafer Toprak. Toprak argues that, while the period between the Revolution and 
1912 was characterised by a belief in and a practice of economic liberalism (free 
trade, support for foreign capital etc.), for this time to the end of the World War I, 
CUP adopted a policy of ‘milli iktisat’(national economy) and attempted to put the 
economy under strict control and favoured small Muslim entrepreneurs vis-à-vis 
foreign and non-Muslim ones63. On the contrary, the above investigation of the 
policies of the CUP on the coal basin suggests that such a significant turn did not 
exist in the economic policies of the post-Revolutionary Ottoman state, at least 
concerning the coal basin. Rather, throughout the period in question, there were 
attempts on the part of the CUP government to exert a firmer and closer control on 
Ottoman economy; but these attempts, for different reasons, failed. As is discussed 
in relation to the labour issue in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3 below, the Ottoman state 
of the time was influenced by a number of factors, some of which stemmed from 
its very nature, and was under various internal and external pressures, and thereby 
could find only little room to take initiative in such economic policy issues. 
 
2.2.5 The Basin through the War Years, 1918-1922 
The onset of the World War I marked the end of the operation of French capital in 
the basin. During the war, a war coal centre was established under the command of 
a German officer64. It should be noted that this was strikingly similar to the 
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situation during the Crimean War, when the administration of the basin was 
actually left to Britain. During the German control, the German capital in the basin 
initiated some new investments and replaced the impact of French capital with its 
impact65. In 1920, however, the region was occupied by the French. French troops 
took control of the strategic Zonguldak port and deployed extensive forces in 
Kozlu, Kilimli and Kapuz coasts and Ereğli’s Bababurnu coast.  Having confronted 
a significant resistance from the people, the French troops left Zonguldak and its 
surrounding in June 1921, and thus ended the fifteen-month occupation66. 
After the end of occupation, the Ankara government took control of the 
region and initiated legislation concerning the basin. The first law, the law no.11, 
was enacted on 15 August 1920, when French troops were still in the region. It 
imposed an additional tax of three liras from washed coal and two liras from 
unwashed coal per ton67. The discussions held in the Assembly concerning this law 
suggests that, at the time, there was a kind of dual authority (of French troops and 
the Ankara government) over the coal basin68. The National Assembly also passed 
the law no.114, "Zonguldak ve Ereğli Havza-i Fahmiyesinde Mevcut Kömür 
Tozlarının Amele Menafi-i Umumiyesine Olarak Füruhtuna Dair Kanun" (Law on 
Selling the Coal Powders of Zonguldak and Ereğli Coal Basin for the General 
Interests of the Workers) on April 28, 1921 and the law no.151, "Ereğli Havzai 
Fahmiyesi Maden Amelesinin Hukukuna Müteallik Kanun" (Law Concerning the 
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Rights of Mine Workers of the Ereğli Coal Basin) on 10 September 192169. These 
three pieces of legislation is discussed in more detail in Section 2.3.5 below. 
Up until this point, I have tried to present significant developments that 
occurred in the basin from 1848 to 1922. In the course of these 75 years, the basin 
witnessed many changes in terms of legal status, administration, concessions, 
capital composition, infrastructure, technology and so on. Some of these changes 
had an impact on workers, but some did not. Furthermore, workers were not always 
the passive objects of this interplay of forces involving the Ottoman state, and the 
local and foreign capitalists. Particularly towards the end of the period in question, 
the workers emerged as a subject and influenced the developments in the basin. 
Thus, the following section is devoted to the historical process in which the 
workers of the basin transformed themselves from passive objects to historical 
subjects. 
 
2.3 The miners of the basin: Misery and Struggle 
Apart from the historical development of the mines in the basin, the workers who 
have worked in the mines constitute the main focus of this study. The beginning 
and intensification of mining in the region has meant much to the people of the 
region, which has been predominantly agricultural for centuries. The mines and all 
kinds of commercial activity surrounding the mines gradually but irrecoverably 
transformed their lives. Men, women or children gradually became a part of the 
mining activity of the region. The immigrant workers, who have been parts of other 
cultural environments and who, at least in the beginning, had been in a different 
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kind of relationship to their jobs than the native workers, were necessarily involved 
in this profound historical transformation. There are infinitely many questions to be 
asked about the lives of the workers in the region; and unfortunately, as I have 
noted before, we are in a position to answer only a number of them accurately.  
 
2.3.1 The miners until ‘Dilaver Paşa Nizamnamesi’ 
From the mid-century onwards, mining intensified in the Ereğli-Zonguldak region, 
an area where agriculture has been the main occupation for ages. Therefore, during 
the Hazine-i Hassa management, naturally, there was a shortage of experienced 
skilled workers. Because of this, Montenegrin and Croatian miners were employed; 
on the other hand, a native labour force, which is familiar with coal mining 
practices and techniques, emerged gradually. Yet, the labour problem remained 
unsolved and its one or another aspect constituted a chief obstacle for both the 
Ottoman government and its concessionaires throughout the period that I examine 
here. 
I have noted above that the mining in the region was carried out with 
strikingly primitive techniques under Hazine-i Hassa. The price of this for the 
workers was an unhealthy and highly risky working environment. The disorganised 
and arbitrary nature of the management of the coal basin negatively affected the 
miners’ lives and they worked without any regulations concerning the most basic 
working conditions, not to mention those pertaining to ‘social security’. The 
working hours were calculated according to the formula “from dawn to sunset”. No 
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hospital was constructed for the treatment of workers injured in accidents. There 
were no doctors even in places where the worker population was the most dense70. 
 
2.3.2 ‘Dilaver Paşa Nizamnamesi’ 
A detailed regulation that concerned different aspects of mining in the basin was 
promulgated in 1867 and from that time onwards is known as ‘Dilaver Paşa 
Nizamnamesi’, with reference to the local administrator of the region at the time. 
The regulation constitutes one of the most controversial phenomena not only for 
the history of the workers of the region but also for the historiography of the 
Ottoman-Turkish working class in general. After giving an account of the most 
important articles of the regulation, I will turn to these debates. 
i. The regulation recognised three categories of workers: Kazmacı 
(sapper), küfeci (basketman) and kiracı (those who furnished the animals to 
work the pumps), and the first of them enjoyed preferential treatment71. 
ii. The regulation created an obligatory labour system. Villagers in the 
14 kazas (districts) of Ereğli sancak (province) were obliged to perform 
certain tasks in the mines. The muhtar (headman) of each village was to 
oversee the whole process of providing the roster, dispatching the workers 
punctually and distributing the wages to workers72. 
iii. The hiring of workers from outside the 14 districts was forbidden. 
iv. The regulation provided protection to all categories of workers in 
the form of regular pay schedules, limited work hours, clearly defined labour 
conditions, medical and pharmaceutical care, dormitories for workers, 
                                                          
70 Ahmet Naim quoted in Çıladır, Zonguldak Havzası, p.30. 
71 Quataert, Disintegration, p.55-6. 
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regulated work hours, regulated holidays and measures against workers’ 
dismissal without cause etc73. 
The Ottoman government’s intention in putting into effect this detailed 
regulation has been a point of debate among researchers. Yıldırım Koç, for 
example, argues that the goal of the regulation was not to protect the workers but to 
increase production in the mines74. On the other hand, for Quataert, “[t]he 
government imposed the regulations on the mines in order to balance its desire for 
coal with that for domestic stability and continuation of the prevailing agricultural 
system.”75 Perhaps a more important point of controversy pertains to the 
implementation of ‘Dilaver Paşa Nizamnamesi’. It is not certain which articles of 
this one-hundred-article regulation was implemented fully or to a considerable 
extent. A report in 1875 from an engineer attached to the Department of Mines and 
a proposal of French investors in 188076 suggests that at least some of the articles 
of the regulation were implemented properly. In any case, it is inaccurate to think 
that the regulation changed the working and living conditions of the thousands of 
workers of the basin immediately and in toto. The enactment of such a detailed 
regulation in 1867 is a major event in itself and much research is needed before we 
can judge about the fate of the requirements it imposed. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
72 Ibid.,p.55. 
73 Ibid., p.56. 
74 Yıldırım Koç, 100 Soruda Türkiye’de İşçi Sınıfı ve Sendikacılık Hareketi (İstanbul: Gerçek, 
1998), p.19. 
75 Quataert, Disintegration, p.56. 
76 quoted in ibid., pp.56-7. 
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2.3.3 Workers after the ‘Dilaver Paşa Nizamnamesi’  
Despite the article of the regulation that had forbidden the hiring of non-native 
labourers, hiring of foreign and non-native Ottoman workers continued77. Leaving 
aside the ongoing poor workplace conditions, the main problem of workers during 
this era seems to be that of payment of wages on time. This problem prevailed in 
1875 and continued for at least two decades78. 
The concession given to Ereğli Company should have meant a great deal of 
change for the workers as well. A great majority of the workers now worked for a 
foreign company that controlled an important part of the basin. It seems that the 
plight of the workers perpetuated under the Ereğli company. In general, the 
company declined to provide adequate nutrition, accommodation and training for 
the workers79. We learn from the memoirs of Yusuf Tatar, a miner, that when he 
started to work in the mines at the age of 9 in 1905, he and other workers used to 
work with undetermined working hours and they sometimes stayed in the pit for 
16-17 hours80. As we shall discuss in Chapter 4, the pit accidents also persisted. 
Thus, the previous situation of the labour continued and due to the 
persistence of an insecure and unhealthy working and living environment, 
problems in payments, the workers’ dependence to the agricultural cycle, and lastly 
the mobilisation for war after 1903 Macedonian crisis, the company suffered a 
constant shortage of labour. It is known that the company repeatedly demanded the 
Ottoman government that the restriction of hiring non-natives workers be 
abolished. For this demand to be fulfilled, the company had to wait until 1906, 
                                                          
77 Ibid., pp.57-8. 
78 Ibid., p. 58. 
79 Eldem, Tetkik, p.49. 
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when the governor of Kastamonu, under the influence of a local mine operator, 
abolished the restraint and opened the basin to the employment of all Ottoman 
subjects. This decision solved, to a certain extent, the problem of labour shortage, 
which intensified from the 1880s onwards, when large-scale investments to the 
basin began. It also meant the end of the relative period of improvement for the 
workers that took place in this period of labour shortage. At the beginning of the 
20th century, the total number of people employed in the basin by Ereğli company 
and other firms was around 10,000. An estimated of ¾ of the workers were 
rotational, remaining in the mines for two or three weeks at a time. The remaining 
¼ of work force was permanent and consisted of Kurdish and Laz workers who 
worked mainly at the surface81. 
 
2.3.4 Workers in Struggle: The Strikes of 1908 
During the second half of 1908, a wave of strikes shook the Empire. From 24th July 
to the end of that year, 111 strikes were organised across the Empire, from Salonica 
to İstanbul, Aydın to Beirut, Adana to Monastır (Bitola). This density in worker 
activism has not been seen again in Turkish history down to the present82. The 
workers of the coal basin also played their part in the strikes. There were four 
strikes in the basin until the end of 1908, and the one in 14th September was the 
most effective, virtually involving all workers in the region. Like some other cases 
across the Empire, the government sent troops to the region to suppress the strike83. 
The company reacted to the strikes by accusing a number of ‘foreign agitators’ who 
                                                                                                                                                                 
80 quoted in Tuncer, Tarihten Günümüze, pp. 46-7. 
81 Quataert, Disintegration, p.60. 
82 M.Şehmus Güzel, Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketi 1908-1984 (İstanbul: Kaynak, 1996), pp.31-2. 
83 Ibid., pp.54-55; Quataert, Disintegration, p.64. 
 31
prevented the rest of the work force from going to their jobs. The ‘foreign 
agitators’ mentioned by the company were the newly hired metal miners from 
Sivas and Zonguldak, who were full-time skilled and mostly Christian workers. It 
is interesting to note that despite company’s effort, the local Ottoman officials 
effectively prevented the punishment of the ‘agitators’ of the strikes: “Some of the 
strikers were arrested, but Ottoman officials at Zonguldak intervened and sought 
their release, even from İstanbul jails”.84 One may perhaps conclude that this 
difference in the attitudes of central and local Ottoman officials towards the strikers 
indicates that the strikers and their demands and activities enjoyed a kind of 
legitimacy in the local community; or perhaps there was a more direct link between 
the workers and the officials. Another explanation may be that the local officials’ 
attitude should be considered within the context of local (capital’s) hostility 
towards foreign capital. In any case, however, one should be cautious about the 
nature of this relation until adequate research is conducted. 
After the strike, the Ereğli Company raised salaries on an average of 30 
percent and accepted the demands of the workers. During the years following the 
strikes, it engaged in large-scale housing projects for the workers85. These 
developments may be conceived to depict that the strikes in the basin resulted in a 
remarkable success for the workers. The high rate of participation and the apparent 
sympathetic attitude of local officials, in addition to the ongoing problem of 
shortage of work force, may have forced the company to accept the workers’ 
demands. On the other hand, one should not be so quick to evaluate the success or 
                                                          
84 Ibid., p.66. 
85 Ibid., pp.64, 66. 
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failure of the strikes86. Besides, the outcome of the strikes of 1908 in the basin may 
not be as important as it seems at first sight. It is clear that this first organised 
workers’ action with a dramatically high rate of participation is a crucial 
development in the history of the basin and it definitely changed the line of the 
workers’ struggles, both materially and ideologically / symbolically. 
The strikes of 1908 by no means put an end to workers’ struggle in the 
basin. To our knowledge, six more strikes broke out in the basin until 191487. 
Given the lack of research on primary sources and thus the derivative nature of 
most secondary sources, it should be expected that more incidents than known had 
occurred. Besides, the presently known number of ten strikes from 1908 to 1914 
well depicts that strikes have become a part of workers’ resistance and struggle 
tradition. 
 
2.3.5 Legislation of the Ankara Government 
As mentioned above, the Turkish Grand National Assembly enacted three laws 
related to the basin in the years 1920 and 1922. The first one (no.11)88, which was 
passed on August 15, 1920, was not directly related to labour. It was imposing an 
additional tax on coal extracted in the basin. Despite this limited nature of this law, 
a number of diverse issues arose during the discussions held in the general council 
of the Assembly. The name of the basin, the possibility of a British attack on the 
mines and the conscription of the men living in the region were among the issues 
that were discussed. The most important point of debate, however, was whether an 
                                                          
86 This point is further discussed in Chapter 3. 
87 One of them is presented and discussed in Chapter 4 in detail. 
88 See Appendix 25 for the text of the law. 
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article on the health and safety of workers should be added. In the end, the bills to 
include such an article were rejected and the law pertained only to taxation89. 
Another bill about the basin became law on April 28, 1921 (no.114)90. Its 
official name was "Zonguldak ve Ereğli Havza-i Fahmiyesinde Mevcut Kömür 
Tozlarının Amele Menafi-i Umumiyesine Olarak Füruhtuna Dair Kanun" (Law on 
Selling the Coal Powders of Zonguldak and Ereğli Coal Basin for the General 
Interests of the Workers) and as the title suggests, the goal of this five-article law 
was to provide benefits to the workers of the coal basin from the revenue of the 
coal powder produced in the basin. The discussions in the Assembly about this law 
were also very interesting. Some deputies who were against the bill accused the 
defenders for ‘bolshevism’. A great deal of debate focused on the rights of workers 
and how they could be defended. The owner of the property of the coal powder 
produced in the basin (whether the state, the mine operators, or the workers) was 
also questioned. In the vote, 118 deputies voted for the bill and 47 deputies 
against91. 
The third, and the most important, law (no.151)92 concerning the basin and 
its workers was enacted on 10 September 1921 and its name was "Ereğli Havza-i 
Fahmiyesi Maden Amelesinin Hukukuna Müteallik Kanun" (Law Concerning the 
Rights of Mine Workers of the Ereğli Coal Basin). The article consisted of 15 
articles and regulated very important aspects of labour in the basin. The law banned 
forced labour and the employment of minors underground and established 
minimum wage. It also determined working hours as eight hours a day. It also 
                                                          
89 Zabıt Ceridesi 3, pp.172, 213-23. 
90 See Appendix 26 for the text of the law. 
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imposed several requirements on mine operators: among other things, they had to 
build dormitories and baths for the workers, keep regular records of their 
employees, compensate the loss of personal property of workers during work. The 
employers were also required to provide medical care to workers and ensure the 
medical treatment of the injured ones free of charge. They also were required to 
pay compensation to the relatives of the workers killed in accidents. Another 
important provision of the law was the establishment of Amele Birliği (Workers’ 
Association) reserve and aid fund, which would be financed by mine operators with 
one percent of total wages every month93. Amele Birliği also had the authority to 
inspect the records of the operators and sue them in the court on behalf of the 
sufferers of accidents.  
The law no.151 brought about vivid and heated debate in the Assembly. 
From formal matters such as whether the word “amil” (operator) or “sahip” 
(owner) was better and whether “amele” (worker/workers) or “ırgat” (worker) 
should be preferred, to more substantial matters such as socialism and communism 
were included in the debate. Some deputies considered the requirements imposed 
on mine operators to be too much to be handled. Whether the state should establish 
a worker organisation was also questioned. Article 7, which set forth the legal 
process after the accidents, created great controversy and long legal disputes, and 
could be passed only after a return to the related commission94. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
91 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Cilt 10, Devre 1, İçtima Senesi 2 (Ankara, 1958), p.25-32, 122-24, 149-
50. 
92 See Appendix 27 for the text of the law. 
93 A discussion of Amele Birliği could be found in Chapter 3, section 3.6.1. 
94 T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi, Cilt 10, Devre 1, İçtima 2 (Ankara, 1958), pp.197-224 and T.B.M.M. 
Zabıt Ceridesi, Cilt 12, Devre 1, İçtima 2 (Ankara, 1958), pp.172-79. 
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The law no.114 and particularly no.151 included provisions that would 
substantially improve the conditions of labour in the basin. In addition, the minutes 
show that, during the discussions, some deputies of the dominant group in the 
Assembly overtly leaned towards workers. On the other hand, the significance of 
these three pro-labour bills should not be exaggerated. As some deputies admitted, 
the fact that most mine operators were foreign or non-Muslim and almost all 
workers were Muslim/Turkish should have played an important role in providing 
the ground for this pro-labour and anti-capital intervention of the government and 
the Assembly. Although these two bills, particularly the second one, could be 
considered progressive labour legislation, we do not have much information about 
to what extent their provisions were observed after the extraordinary conditions of 
the interregnum period ended.95 
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CHAPTER 3 
WAGES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A more or less complete historical investigation of the workers of the coal basin 
necessitates the study of very diverse aspects of their lives, including wages, 
conditions in the workplace, family life, community life, solidarity and conflict 
among them, their political attitudes etc. Given obvious limitations, however, this 
study first of all focuses on wages. I single out wages because wages are important 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, they are a good indicator of the quality of life of 
the workers; analysing the level of the wages, we can make some hopefully 
accurate points about the quality of the life that working in the mines provide to the 
workers. Secondly, wages are related to some other important issues such as 
hierarchy between workers (in terms of skill, ethnicity, or some other factor), 
government’s or mine operators’ attitude towards workers, the availability of 
labour, the overall economic conditions within the region etc. Thirdly, wages 
constitute one of, if not the most important single issue over which conflict 
between workers and employers take place, and thus the wage level may be a 
reliable indicator of the success or failure of workers’ struggles. Lastly, the wage 
data are more ‘concrete’ and thereby more easily analysable. 
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In this chapter, I first summarise and evaluate the existing state of knowledge about 
the wages in the coal basin. Then I move on to discuss the points that I derive from 
the study of archival sources. 
 
3.2 Ottoman Wages 
Given the underdeveloped state of research in the field of Ottoman labour history, 
it is not surprising that the studies about the Ottoman wages are far from being 
sufficient in both quantity and quality. There’s still much to do in this area of 
labour history. This does not mean, however, that informative works about 
Ottoman wages do not exist. Charles Issawi, for one, has shown that for the 
nineteenth century Ottoman economy, wages as a type of income and wage earners 
as an economic group could be empirically studied96. This is in itself an important 
step forward; for in the literature there are plenty of works that argue that the class 
of wage earners does not constitute a meaningful category for this period of 
Ottoman history. 
The basic work that gives us substantial information about Ottoman workers is that 
of Vedat Eldem97. Eldem also admits that our knowledge about the working life of 
wage earners hardly goes beyond theoretical considerations and clichés98. Yet he 
compiles very useful information about the wages in the Empire. There are figures 
about wages in different industries, such as food, leather, textile and mining 
industries99, different regions of the Empire, such as İstanbul, the coal basin, 
                                                          
96 Gündüz Ökçün et al., “Osmanlı Devleti’nde Ücretler (1839-1913)”, Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e 
Türkiye Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), p.753. 
97 Vedat Eldem, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun İktisadi Şartları Hakkında Bir Tetkik (Ankara: TTK, 
1994). 
98 Ibid., p.138. 
99 Ibid., p.142. 
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Damascus and Bursa100, and different countries, such as Bulgaria, Greece and 
Romania101. It is also possible to find information about the development of the 
salaries of Ottoman officials as well.  
Eldem argues that, in comparison to neighbouring countries, the wages in 
the Ottoman Turkey were higher. While the average wage in what is now Turkey in 
the eve of WWI was 12,5 piasters, it was 8,5 in what is now Syria, 10,34 in 
Bulgaria, 13,5 in Greece (Athens/Piraeus) and 14,0 in Romania. Although the 
figures suggest that the level of the wages in Ottoman Turkey was not above some 
neighbouring countries, given the relatively low level of prices, the purchasing 
power of the wages were higher than these countries102. 
Another study that is significant for the study of wages in the Ottoman 
Empire has been conducted by Gündüz Ökçün, Korkut Boratav and Şevket 
Pamuk103. Their main argument is that during the period between Tanzimat and 
World War I, both the nominal and real wages show a significant increase. 
According to their calculations, between 1839 and 1913, nominal wages rose by 
118% (or with a different method 123%) and real wages by 170% (with a different 
method 120%). They point out that the main mechanism behind this long-term 
tendency was the sharp rises that have occurred during times of war and chaos104. 
 
                                                          
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid., p.145. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ökçün et al., “Ücretler”. 
104 Ibid., p.756. 
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3.3 Wages in the Coal Basin 
Up until now, we do not have sufficient information about the level of wages in the 
Ereğli-Zonguldak coal basin. Besides, it is not certain to what extent the existing 
figures are reliable. 
Since the coal basin is the first area where a concentration of an important 
number of workers occurred, Eldem’s main reference in discussing the workers and 
wages in the Empire is the workers of the Ereğli-Zonguldak coal mine workers. 
According to the figures he provides, there is an apparent nominal increase in the 
wages from 1900 to 1913. However, if we take into account the consumer prices 
index of İstanbul of that period and assume that the trend in consumer prices in the 
coal basin did not diverge considerably from that in İstanbul, the picture changes. 
While there is a real increase in the wages in the 1900-1905 period, there is a 
significant drop from 1905 to 1911 and a slight decrease during the years 1911-
1913. Overall, the real wages decreased by slightly, namely by 5 percent from 1900 
to 1913. 
          Table 1: Average daily wages in the coal basin105 
Year Piasters 1900=100 İstanbul C.P.I.106 
1900 7,6 100 100 
1905 8,6 113 104 
1911 9,7 127 135 
1913 10,2 131 126 
 
Donald Quataert reaches also a similar conclusion about the daily wages in the 
basin. If we compare his figures of the 1900-1911 period with those of Eldem, we 
                                                          
105 Compiled from Eldem, Tetkik, p.141 and Şevket Pamuk, İstanbul ve Diğer Kentlerde 500 Yıllık 
Fiyatlar ve Ücretler 1469-1998 (Ankara: DİE, 2000), pp. 17-8. 
106 C.P.I.: consumer prices index.  
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see that the former presents a real decrease of 18 percent, while the latter gives us a 
real decrease of 8 percent. On the other hand, Quataert’s figures extend to a time 
period of over thirty years; thus, given the real increase in the wages from 1875 to 
1900, he concludes that at least for the three groups that was covered in the Dilaver 
Paşa regulations, wages seem to have remained unchanged for these thirty years107. 
The figures that he gives and the İstanbul consumer price index are as follows: 
Table2: Daily Wages at Ereğli (in piasters)108 
Category of worker 1875 1882 1890 1900 1907 1908-1911 
Kazmacı (sapper) 15-18   8-20 12 10-20 
Küfeci (transporter) 6    6 6 
Kiracı (pumper)  5 6 6   
İstanbul C.P.I. 100 - 100,4 80 89 100,7 
 
 
3.4 Wages in the Coal Basin according to Karaelmeas University Archives 
3.4.1 Wages during 1905-1911 
The fundamental sources in the archives about the mine workers’ wages is the six 
yevmiye defteris (daily wage registers) that belong to the financial years 1321, 
1322, 1323, 1324 (1905-09) and 1338 (1922). As we have seen above, both Eldem 
and Quatert provide figures concerning the years 1905-1909; these registers, 
however, do not constitute a sound basis for comparison with the figures presented 
by Eldem and Quataert. First of all, the registers include data not about daily 
payments but about aggregate payments; we do not know for how many days’ 
work the payment was made. For example, from one of these registers, we learn 
                                                          
107 Donald Quataert, Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881-
1908 Reactions to European Economic Penetration (New York and London: New York University 
Press, 1983), p.61. 
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that “Asker Bilal oğlu Raşid bin Mustafa” got 15 piasters and 20 paras on 17 Mart 
1321 (30 March 1905)109. However, there is no information about the duration of 
the work for which this payment was made. Another method may be summing up 
the amounts of all payments made in a day. If one does so, it is seen that on March 
30, 1905 the total money given to workers is 1760,35; the number of workers is 
134 and the amount per capita is 13,5110. On 10 Mayıs 1321 (23 May 1905), the 
total amount is 1517 piasters, the number of workers is 109 and the average 
payment is 13,35 piasters111. Since the two figures are very proximate to each 
other, in the light of the findings of Eldem and Quataert, it seems plausible to 
deduce that the average daily wage in this mine was around 13 piasters in the year 
1905. Two significant objections, however, could be raised against this deduction. 
Firstly, we cannot learn from the register anything about the workers’ skill levels. 
Given the fact that in the mines, along with the skilled workers (sappers, for 
example), there must have been a significant number of semi-skilled and unskilled 
ones, the average of over 13 piasters seems incomprehensibly high. Secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, the workers noted in this112 and some other113 registers 
are qualified as “asker”, i.e. they are working obligatorily in the mines as a part of 
military service. It is known that such workers in the coal basin normally got only a 
portion of the daily wage paid to other workers114. Therefore, again, the figures that 
come out of the registers that belong to 1905-1909 period are implausibly high. To 
                                                                                                                                                                 
108 Compiled from ibid., p.60 and Pamuk, Fiyatlar ve Ücretler, pp. 17-8. 
109 “Ereğli Kömür Maden-i Hümayunu Tahsilat Sarfiyat Sandık Yevmiye Defteri”, Karaelmas 
Üniversitesi Arşivi (KÜA), no.68, p.4. 
110 Ibid., pp.4-7. 
111 Ibid., pp.13-5. 
112 KÜA, no.68. 
113 KÜA, no.92 (1321 / 1905-6), no.80 (1322 / 1906-7) and no.79 (1323 / 1907-8). 
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sum up, although these registers provide useful information in different aspects, 
they do not constitute a reliable source for the calculation of average daily wages in 
the basin. 
On the other hand, the evrak defteris (registers in which incoming and 
outgoing correspondence has been recorded) of the years 1325-1326 (1909-1911) 
provides sporadic yet reliable information about the wages of some categories of 
workers in these years. For example, it is noted that the daily wage of both a gece 
ateşçisi (night fireman) and a ateşçi (fireman) was 8 piasters115. The makasçıs 
(railyway switchmen) got either 7116 or 8117 piasters per diem. Around 1910, a 
demirci (blacksmith) was employed with a daily wage of 10 piasters118. The daily 
wage of a marangoz (carpenter) was significantly higher: he got 14 piasters a 
day119. On the other hand, there were workers who got monthly payments. A 
makinist (engine-driver) were paid 360 piasters a month120, a zincirci (chainman) 
250121 and a carpenter 450 piasters122. Thus, around the years 1910-1911, the daily 
wages of these employees of the mine administration was as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                 
114 For detailed information about ‘asker’ (soldier) workers, see Erol Çatma, Asker İşçiler (İstanbul: 
Ceylan, 1998). 
115 KÜA, no.40, p.71 (Teşrin-i Sani 1325 / November-December 1909) and no.41, p.81 (20 Şubat 
1326 / 5 March 1911). 
116 KÜA, no.40, p.82 (28 Şubat 1325 / 13 March 1910) and no.41, entry no.3165/111 (7 Haziran 
1326 / 20 June 1910). 
117 KÜA, no.40, p.80 (14 Şubat 1325 / 27 February 1910). 
118 KÜA, no.41, entry no.3127/106 (3 Haziran 1326 / 16 June 1910). 
119 KÜA, no. 40, p.108 (18 Şubat 1325 / 3 March 1910). 
120 KÜA, no.41, entry no.3029/94 (18 Mayıs 1326 / 31 Mayıs 1910). 
121 Ibid. and KÜA, no.41, entry no. 3165/111 (7 Haziran 1326 / 20 June 1910). 
122 KÜA, no. 41, p.64 (11 Kanun-ı Sani 1326 / 24 January 1911). 
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   Table 3: Daily Wages During 1910-1911 
Worker Daily Wage 
Ateşçi (fireman) 8 
Makasçı (switchman) 7-8 
Zincirci (chainman) 8,3 
Makinist (engine-driver) 12 
Marangoz (carpenter) 14-15 
 
These are significant figures that provide, at least, a rough idea about the level of 
wages before the advent of the war years. On the other hand, it should also be noted 
that the workers in question were not directly involved in the extraction process of 
coal. They were performing auxiliary tasks and mainly employed in the 
transportation. Indeed, the transportation of coal has been a major part of the coal 
production not only in Ottoman Empire, but in coal-producing countries as well. 
Coal transportation through land and without railways was irrationally costly.123 
Likewise, in the Zonguldak-Ereğli coal basin, the railways were of paramount 
importance in transporting coal from the pits to the port. Thus, the railway workers 
were a significant part of this process. On the other hand, since the railway lines 
were operated by the mine administration itself, these workers were employed 
directly by the mine administration, but not by companies or individual mine 
operators124. Moreover, it can be assumed that the number of workers who worked 
in the actual extraction far outweighed that of those working in the transportation-
related jobs. Therefore, although the figures concerning the daily wages of these 
                                                          
123 Ben Fine, The Coal Question: Political Economy and Industrial Change from the Nineteenth 
Century to the Present Day (London: Routledge, 1990), pp.6-8. 
124 It should be noted, however, that the Gelik-Çatalağzı and Üzülmez-Zonguldak railway lines were 
operated by the French company; see Kerim Yund (ed.), Seçkin Türk Ormancısı Hüseyin Fehmi 
İmer Hayatı-Hatıraları (İstanbul: Baha, 1973), p.50. 
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workers are valuable and meaningful, one should be careful not to extend them to 
workers working in the pits. 
 
3.4.2 Wages circa 1922 
In contrast to the yevmiye defterleri that date from 1321-1324 (1905-09), those that 
belong to the years 1338-1339 (1922-23) constitute a valuable source for 
calculating (or, at least, estimating) daily wages. In two of these registers125, the 
category of workers and the daily wages they get are explicitly stated. If we 
combine the information in these two registers, we reach such figures: 
Table 4:Categories of Workers and their Wages around 1922 
Type of worker Daily wage 
(piasters) 
Type of worker Daily wage 
(piasters) 
Tamirci 90-135 Tamirci çavuşu 145 
Tamirci yedeği 70-95 Maden mektebi 
talebesi 
100 
Kazmacı 85-105 Yol marangozu 180 
Kazmacı yedeği 70-100 Amele çavuşu 170 
Amele 60-75 Lağımcı 100-125 
Çubukçu 90 Sopacı 80 
Çavuş 130-160 Sucu 70 
Arabacı 70-75 Manavracı 65 
Küfeci 60-80 Başçavuş Muavini 200-250 
Kuyucu 60-80 Dahili Katip 160 
Kuyucu Yedeği 77-80 Varageleci 90 
Marangoz 100-180 Başçavuş 200 
Marangoz yedeği 80 Direk katibi 80 
Bekçi 130 Dengeci yamağı 65 
Ateşçi 100-120 Hizmetli 85 
Vinçci 80 Pişirici 120 
Madenci 60 Demirci kalfası 100 
Taşcı 80 Saççı  80 
Dahili başçavuş 130   
 
                                                          
125 KÜA, no.217 “Sarrafiye Ocakları 287 Numerolu Ocağın Amele Kayıt Defteri, 1338-9” ve KÜA, 
no.66 “64 Numerolu İktisad Ocağının Amele-i Daime ve Muvakkata Esas Kayıt Defteri”. 
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These categories and wages could be grouped into three: 
A. Unskilled workers or mates of skilled workers: tamirci yedeği (repairman’s 
mate), kazmacı yedeği (sapper’s mate: the worker who assists the sapper in 
transporting his tools and who put the coal cut by the sapper to the chute), 
amele (literally worker, here unskilled worker), çubukçu (?), arabacı (carter), 
küfeci (basketman), kuyucu (well-sinker), kuyucu yedeği (well-sinker’s mate), 
marangoz yedeği (carpenter’s mate), madenci (?), taşcı (mason), sopacı (?), 
vinçci (winch operator), sucu (waterman), varageleci (the worker responsible 
for the machine with which heavy material is transported within pits), dengeci 
yamağı (?), hizmetli (employee?), saçcı (the worker who controls and directs 
the full and empty trams in the crossroads of the pit), direk katibi (the worker 
who counts the wooden props used in the pit), manavracı (same as vinççi). The 
most important workers that falls into this category are küfeci and kazmacı 
yedeği. 
B. Skilled workers: tamirci (repairman), kazmacı (sapper), ateşçi (fireman), maden 
mektebi talebesi (student from mining school), lağımcı (the worker who opens 
holes in the shafts, puts dynamites or gunpowder into these holes and bursts 
them), pişirici (?), demirci kalfası (blacksmith’s journeyman). The main type of 
worker in this group is kazmacı, who is one of the most important elements of 
actual production. 
C. High-level skilled or supervising workers: çavuş (foreman / boss), marangoz 
(carpenter), bekçi (watchman), dahili başçavuş (internal head-foreman), tamirci 
çavuşu (repairman’s boss), yol marangozu (the worker who paves rails into the 
pit and repairs them), amele çavuşu (worker’s boss), başçavuş muavini 
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(assistant head-foreman), dahili katip (the worker who records the underground 
use of different materials and tools), başçavuş (head-foreman). The main type 
in this category are various kinds of çavuşs, who supervise the work process126. 
 
3.4.3 Changes in Wages through the Years of War, 1911-1922 
If we combine the wage figures from 1922 with those of 1911, and the consumer 
price figures, the below table emerges: 
Table 5: Wages from 1911 to 1922 
 1911 1922 Change (%) 
Sapper 10-20 (15) 127 95 128 850-375 (533) 
Basketman 6 129 70 130 1066 
Carpenter 14-15 (14.5) 131 140132 900-833 (866.5) 
Fireman 8133 110134 1275 
İstanbul C.P.I.135 100 1198 1098 
 
As clear in the figures of İstanbul consumer prices’ index, the inflation rate during 
the war years was very high; the prices increased eleven times from 1911 to 1922. 
If we look at the wages and compare their increase with that of the prices, we see 
that while some of the wages could match or even surpass the increase in the 
prices, some of them could not. If the wage of fireman is taken, for example, a real 
increase could be noticed. The wage of a basketman more or less matches the 
                                                          
126 The English equivalent of the Turkish terms in Table 4 has been compiled from Ülgen Oskay, 
Geçiş Dönemi Tipi Olarak Zonguldak Kömür Havzası Maden İşçisi (İzmir: Ege Ü. Edebiyat F., 
1983); Ahmet Naim, Bir Yudum Soluk. Maden İşçilerinin Ocak İçi Yaşantıları, 2nd ed., (Ereğli: 
Şirin Ereğli, 1983); Dilip Simeon, “Coal and Colonialism: Production Relations in an Indian 
Coalfield, c.1895-1947”, International Review of Social History, 41 (1996), pp.83-108; and 
personal communication with Erol Çatma. 
127 1908-11. Quataert, Disintegration, p.60.  
128 KÜA, no.217. 
129 1908-11. Quataert, Disintegration, p.60. 
130 KÜA, no.217. 
131 KÜA, no.40, p.108; no.41, p.64. 
132 KÜA, no.217; no.66. 
133 KÜA no.40, p.71; no.41, p.81. 
134 KÜA, no.217; no.66. 
135 Pamuk, Fiyatlar ve Ücretler, p.18-22. 
 47
increase in the prices. On the other hand, the increase in the wages of sapper and 
carpenter is below the increase in the consumer prices’ index; this is more 
significant in the case of sapper. Although this situation seems to be chaotic, where 
the changes in the wages of different types of workers seem arbitrary, I think that it 
suggests a pattern. The worker types that match or surpass the price increase 
(basketman and fireman) is less skilled ones, whereas the wages of skilled jobs 
(sapper and carpenter) suffered a real decrease. The outcome is an apparent 
convergence of wages of skilled and semi-skilled or unskilled workers as of 1922. 
The daily wage of a fireman even surpassed that of a sapper around this year. The 
case of sapper is particularly important in that he is the one who does the actual 
cutting of coal, and one could say, without exaggeration, that he is the basic 
element of coal extraction process. There may be a number of accounts of this fall 
in sapper wages. Firstly, leaving aside the changes in other daily wages, the 
significant real decrease in the money paid to sappers should have generated a 
considerable fall in the production costs in the basin. It follows from this reasoning 
that the factor behind the real decrease in sapper wages is that the great number of 
sappers employed in the pits made the suppression of their wages particularly 
beneficial for the mine operators136. Secondly, if the diminishing real wage of 
carpenter is conceived along with the situation of the sappers, one may conclude 
that from 1911 to 1922, there is a decrease in the monetary reward of skill, or, one 
could say, a re-definition of 'skill' in wage terms. Thirdly, since the sappers were 
                                                          
136 It is not possible to find any information about the proportion of sappers to all workers working 
in the pits during the Ottoman era. We only know that it was around 11 percent in 1942; see Theo 
Nichols and Erol Kahveci, “The Condition of Mine Labour in Turkey: Injuries to Miners in 
Zonguldak”, Middle Eastern Studies, 31(2), 1995, pp.199. Since the level of mechanisation was 
lower in the Ottoman period, it is acceptable to assume that the proportion of sappers, who do the 
actual cutting of coal, to the whole labour force, was higher. 
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mostly rotational workers, who were on and off on a usually fifteen-day basis and 
could also rely on some agricultural income, these workers may have showed less 
resistance to diminishing real wages than the permanent workers whose sole source 
of income was the occupation in the mines. Probably, the real situation was a result 
of the combination of these three factors. In any case, it is clear that while the 
difficult war years eroded the wages of some of the workers of the basin, some 
wages remained intact or even went better off. 
 
3.5 Wages in the Basin, 1875-1922: An Analysis 
The whole discussion conducted in this chapter up until this point about the wages 
in the basin and the Ottoman wages in general could be summarised in Table 6. It 
is important, however, to note that the table is far from being complete. It was 
compiled from many different primary and secondary sources so that there are 
inevitable gaps between the categories. Secondly, some of the data used are only 
tentative. Thirdly, all interpretations regarding the real increase or decrease in the 
coal workers' wages are based on the assumption that the consumer prices' index of 
İstanbul is not dramatically different from that of the coal basin137. Yet, meaningful 
deductions could be done on the basis of this table. Firstly, it has an internal logic 
as a whole; secondly, it provides the ground for conducting a number  
                                                          
137 Eldem remarks that the increase in prices during the WWI in İstanbul is significantly below the 
increase in other provinces, with the exception of Syria, Palestine and Cebel-i Lübnan; see Vedat 
Eldem, Harp ve Mütareke Yıllarında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Ekonomisi (Ankara, TTK, 1994), 
p. 50. Therefore, if this remark is valid, in every comparison between the increase in the wages in 
the basin and İstanbul consumer prices index during WWI, a margin should be left in favour of the 
wages. 
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Notes to Table 6 
 
i “Skilled construction worker” and “unskilled construction worker” data 
taken from Pamuk, Fiyatlar ve Ücretler, pp.73-4; “İstanbul Consumer Prices 
Index” data taken from Ibid., pp.17-22; “Ottoman Wages” data taken from Ökçün 
et al., “Ücretler”, p.754. The rest of the data has been compiled from the following 
secondary and primary sources: Eldem, Harp ve Mütareke Ekonomisi, p.55 ve 
Tetkik, p.141; Quataert, Disintegration, p.60; KÜA no.40, p.71; KÜA no.41 p.64 
and 81; KÜA no.217; KÜA no.66. The deflated figures have been  rounded. Where 
meaningful, the figures that were given as a range (e.g. 10-20) in the original 
source have been replaced with their averages (e.g. 15). Unless otherwise stated, all 
monetary figures are in piasters. 
ii 1908-11 
iii 1908-11 
iv 1910 
v In İstanbul; the units are in silver grams 
vi 1874 
vii Average of 1889 and 1901 figures 
viii Average of 1906 and 1908 figures 
ix Estimate based on the assumption that the rate of silver in akçe remained 
constant from 1915 to 1917 
x Estimate based on the assumption that the rate of silver in akçe remained 
constant from 1915 to 1922 
xi In Istanbul; the units are in silver grams 
xii 1874 
xiii Average of 1889 and 1901 figures 
xiv Average of 1906 and 198 figures 
xv Estimate based on the assumption that the rate of silver in akçe remained 
constant from 1915 to 1917 
xvi Estimate based on the assumption that the rate of silver in akçe remained 
constant from 1915 to 1922 
xvii 1891 
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of limited analyses: e.g. comparing the changes in the wages of sappers and skilled 
construction workers through the 1900-1907 period. 
If we analyse the development of the coal workers' wages from 1875 to 
1922, we see that different categories of workers underwent different processes. 
During this half-a-century period, the increase in sappers' wages is dramatically 
below that in consumer prices. Although being in a better position than the sappers, 
carpenters also suffered a real decline in wages. Basketman wage's development is 
better than both of these two categories, but it is also, albeit slightly, below the 
consumer prices. The position of fireman wages is different from the other three. 
There is a real increase from 1911 to 1922-3. Thus, we see a convergence in wage 
levels: while the previously higher ones suffered significant declines, the 
previously lesser ones remained intact or even improved. I have already discussed 
the possible causes of this convergence in Section 3.4.3, where I analysed the 
changes in the wages through the war years. It is not necessary to repeat the 
discussion here; for, this convergence is mainly an outcome of the period of 1911-
1922. For example, the responsibility of the decline of the 1875-1911 period in the 
overall real decline in sappers' wages is highly insignificant relative to the real 
decline that occurred from 1911 to 1922. 
Another point that should be noted is that the general monetary loss of 
labour during the war years of 1911-22 was mainly due to the loss that occurred 
during WWI. Although we do not have average wage information for the year 
1922, the trend of wages in the basin and in İstanbul for the WWI years on the one 
hand and the ‘armistice’ and interregnum periods on the other well depicts that 
wages recovered during the latter period. 
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3.5.1 The Impact of the Strikes of 1908 
It has been already mentioned that after the Revolution of 1908, various parts of the 
empire, including the coal basin, were shaken by massive strikes. From the 24th 
July to the end of the year, 111 strikes were organised throughout the Ottoman 
territories. Such a density in worker activity may have resulted in, among other 
things, an increase in the wages. Table 6 provides some information to test such an 
assumption. To proceed from general to particular, it is appropriate to start from the 
Ottoman wages, the most comprehensive category in Table 6. Ottoman wages, after 
a period of sharp increase (1875-1882) followed by a relative stability (1882-1900), 
fell 7 percent in real terms from 1900 to 1905. During the period that includes the 
1908 Strikes, namely 1905-1911, the wages rose by 28 percent whereas the 
consumer price index rose by 30 percent. Therefore, during this period the increase 
in wages could only match the increase in prices. As to the average wage in the 
basin, its rate of increase of 12 percent is considerably below the increase in 
consumer prices. Likewise, the basketman wage remained nominally constant and 
thus, in real terms, suffered a decline. On the other hand, after a significant real 
decrease of 25 percent from 1900 to 1907, the sappers' wage had a slight gain; it 
rose by 3 percent from 1907 to 1911. At first sight, the fact that neither the average 
wage nor single wage categories in the basin depicts a significant real increase 
seems to be in contradiction with Quataert’s point that, following the strikes, the 
company raised salaries on an average of 30 percent138. This may really be a 
contradiction; on the other, it can be interpreted in a different way. Although real 
increases are absent or slight, it is evident that there is a nominal rise in wages in 
                                                          
138 Quataert, Disintegration, p.64. 
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the basin. Thus, it is possible to argue that along with other concessions (such as 
large scale housing projects that the company engaged in) that the workers obtained 
as a result of the strikes, a nominal rise helped the wages to at least match the rise 
in prices. This is not to say, to be sure, that the strikes in the basin were definitely a 
success in terms of the wages. What is stressed here is that we are far from judging 
the success in terms of wages of the strikes of 1908 in the basin. Furthermore, if the 
workers did not reach their goal concerning the money they get, this does not mean 
that the strikes as a whole were a failure. Rather, a more empirically based and a 
more wider-angle analysis is needed in order to bring out a more reliable 
judgement on this issue.    
The wages of the construction workers of İstanbul, however, followed a 
different path than that of the coal basin. From 1907 to 1911, the skilled 
construction workers enjoyed a real rise of 46 percent, while their unskilled mates' 
gain exceeds 50 percent. This is particularly striking in the light of the fact that, 
despite 41 strikes took place in İstanbul in 1908 and 13 in 1909-1915 period, no 
construction workers’ strike was noted. Therefore, the apparent rise in construction 
workers’ wages should be accounted for with factors other than the strike of this 
group of workers; the atmosphere brought about by the wave of strikes throughout 
the empire, the more positive stance of the new régime towards labour, or more 
‘conventional’ factors such as labour force scarcity could have been among these. 
Thus, we are faced with a situation in which, of the six categories of wages 
in question, the rise is significantly below the rise in consumer prices, for two, 
slightly below for one, slightly above for one and dramatically above for two. It is 
possible to argue, then, the information gathered in Table 6 does not present an 
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overall picture about the impact of the Strikes of 1908 on the wages in the coal 
basin or on Ottoman wages as a whole. 
 
3.6 Deductions 
A necessary part of the discussion about the wages in the basin should concern the 
deductions made from the miners’ wages under different names. The payments 
made to workers were by no means complete and various cuts and deductions 
affected the wage levels, in some cases, as we shall see, significantly. The problem 
of deductions also leads to the discussion on the first ‘social security’ fund in the 
basin, the Amele Birliği, which will be touched upon briefly. 
 
3.6.1 Amele Birliği 
Amele Birliği was established as a reserve and aid fund by the fourth article of 
“Ereğli Havza-i Fahmiyyesi Maden Amelesinin Hukukuna Müteallik Kanun” 
(no.151, 10 Eylül 1337/10 September 1921). Its goal was to provide the 
mineworkers and their families social and economic aid. It was directly linked to 
the mine administration; its head was the director of Ereğli mines139. The income of 
the fund came from the one percent of wages to be paid by workers and their 
employers and the fines imposed on workers. It is important to note that Amele 
Birliği did not comprise all the workers in the basin. In order to be eligible for the 
aid, it was mandatory to work at least 180 days a year and live in the mine area. 
Thus, the rotational workers and those living in villages could not benefit from the 
fund. 
                                                          
139 Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı ve Tarih Vakfı, 1996), vol.3, 
p.547. 
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As to the establishment of Amele Birliği, up until now, it has been said that 
although the law constituting it enacted in 1921, the actual establishment of the 
fund could be possible only with the “İhtiyat ve Teavün Sandıkları Talimatnamesi” 
(Regulation on Reserve and Aid Funds: no.2608, 22 July 1923)140. The primary 
sources located in Karaelmas University suggest a different interpretation, 
however. In the Yevmiye Defteri of 1338, it is noted that there was a deduction of 
one percent from the wages for the Amele Birliği Teavün Sandığı as early as 
September 1922141: 
Amele Birliği Teavün Sandığı Eylül 338 zarfında zikr-i ati 
hesaplara ber vech-i zir amele istihkakı olarak tahakkuk eden 
 Aslı Yüzde biri 
Amele Tahakkukatı        11856,82                        118,56  
Memurin Maaşatı 1410 14,10 
Yekun 13666,82 132,66142 
 
In another register, “64 Numerolu İktisad Ocağının Amele-i Daime ve Muvakkata 
Esas Kayıt Defteri” (Register of Permanent and Rotational Workers of the İktisad 
mine no.64) we find information that supports the above quotation. Here is an 
exemplary entry143: 
                                                          
140 Ibid. 
141 “The amounts that was transferred to Workers’ Association Aid Fund as due wages during 
September 338 is as follows: 
 Total One Percent 
Workers’ due wages  11856,82 118,56 
Salaries of officials 1410 14,10 
Total 13666,82 132,66” 
 
142 KÜA, no. 194 (Yevmiye Defteri, 1338/1922), p.12. 
143 KÜA, no.66, p.3. 
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Sıra numrosu 
(Number) 
41 Sanatı 
(Occupation) 
Bekçi 
İsmi 
(Name) 
Ömer Yevmiyesi mikdarı 
(Amount of daily wage) 
130 kuruş 
Pederinin ismi 
(Father’s name) 
Hüseyin İstihkakı 
(Due wage) 
39 lira 
Şöhreti 
(Reputation) 
Süleyman 
oğullarından 
Ekmek bedeli 
(Cost of bread) 
3,40 lira 
Tevellüdü 
(Year of birth) 
288 Ambardan alınan eşya bedeli 
(Cost of goods taken from 
storehouse)  
45 kuruş 
Tabiyeti 
(Nationality) 
Türk Felaketzedegana muavenet 
olunmak üzere ber-muceb-i emr 
kat olunan 
(Amount cut for aid to victims 
of disasters) 
2,60 lira 
Kazası 
(District) 
Trabzon Mütebaki alacağı 
(Balance payment) 
32,55 lira 
Karyesi 
(Village) 
- Bononun numrosu 
(Bill no) 
41 
Şubesi 
(Branch) 
Trabzon Bononun tarihi 
(Bill date) 
31 Eylül 38 
Cüzdanın numrosu 
(File no) 
81-87 204 Veznenin numrosu 
(Payment  no) 
71 
Cüzdanın tarihi 
(File date) 
22 Eylül 38 Veznenin tarihi 
(Payment no) 
31 Eylül 38 
 
It is known that the workers who are not members of the fund are called cüzdansız 
amele (worker without file/papers). Therefore, the cüzdan numrosu (file number) 
and cüzdanın tarihi (file date) in this entry refers to the Amele Birliği account of 
this worker. Thus, the argument that Amele Birliği fund were realised only after 
July 1923 is hardly valid. The above quotations concerning September 1922 and 
some other entries in the Yevmiye Defteri of 1922144 are clear enough to suggest 
that, at least, the mandatory contributions of the workers to this fund were in force 
as of 1922. 
                                                          
144 e.g. October 1922, KÜA, no.194, p.20. 
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3.6.2 ‘Official Deductions’ 
Around the year 1922, some other deductions were also imposed on the workers’ 
wages. These deductions went either to charity organisations or the military. For 
example, an amount equal to two days’ payment was cut and sent to the Hilal-i 
Ahmer Cemiyeti (Red Crescent Society)145. The Ankara government also took 
money from workers for the military. Under the title of “vesait-i nakliye-i askeriye 
vergisi” (tax for military transport vehicles) a certain amount of deduction was 
imposed on the permanent workers146. 
There were other forms of deductions as well. The workers of the “64 
Numerolu İktisad Ocağı” –probably this was not peculiar to them- were subject to a 
deduction under the name of “felaketzedegana muavenet olunmak üzere ber muceb-
i emr kat olunan” (the amount deducted in accordance with the directions to be 
used in assisting the victims of disasters). It is important to note that in time, this 
deduction was replaced by that of “vesait-i nakliye-i askeriye”, which suggests that 
the disaster aid was a temporary deduction. 
 
3.6.3 Other Deductions: Bread, Goods, Transport, and Fines 
It is clear from the Yevmiye Defteri of 1338 and the register of permanent and 
rotational workers of the mine 64 that the money equivalent of bread and other 
good given to workers were cut from their due wages. It seems that while the 
money cut for the goods was insignificant, the money equivalent of bread was 
considerable. For instance, while the total due wages of workers included in 
register no.194 for October 1922 was 14925.48 liras, the money equivalent of 
                                                          
145 KÜA, no.194, pp. 28, 37. 
146 KÜA, no.194, p.282. 
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bread and goods was 2074.86 and 87.51 liras, respectively147. Thus, while only 0.6 
percent of the wages went to goods given by the administration to the workers, 14 
percent of the total gross wages were deduced for bread. 
Lastly, there were the fines. Fines were imposed on the workers for several 
reasons; stealing coal and damaging the working materials were among the most 
frequent. The imposition of fines continued around 1922148, but after the 
establishment of Amele Birliği, these amounts were going to the fund. This was 
also a solution to constant tensions and protests on the part of the workers seen in 
the previous years as a reaction to the imposition of arbitrary fines by the mine 
operators149. 
 
3.6.4 After the Deductions: What’s Left? 
It is evident that these various forms of deductions on wages negatively affected 
workers’ livelihoods. The problem is to determine the extent of this effect. If we 
consider the total gross wages and total deductions of October 1922 in register 
no.194, this table emerges: 
                                                          
147 KÜA, no.194, p.18-9. 
148 For example, see KÜA no.217, p.83, 98. 
149 Sina Çıladır,  “Zonguldak Kömür Havzasında İşçi Hareketi ve Sendikacılık” in Türkiye 
Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı ve Tarih Vakfı, 1996), vol.3, p.558. 
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Table 7: Deductions and Total Net Wages  
in İktisad Mine No. 63 in October 1922 
Total gross wage 14925.64 
Bread 2074.86 
Goods 87.51 
Amele Birliği fund 149.25 
Military tax 20.50150 
Hilal-i Ahmer aid 686,50151 
Total deductions 3018.62 
Total net wage 11907.02 
Percentage of deductions 20 
 
Here we see that 20 percent of the due wages of workers were cut in various forms. 
On the other hand, in İktisad mine number 64 in September 1922, the deduction 
rate is even greater: considering that the total gross wage was 111856,82 liras and 
the total net wage 9012.90 liras, the percentage of cuts emerges as high as 24. So 
much for the total figures. The individual figures confirm the above calculation. If 
we take, for instance, the money paid to “Süleymanoğullarından Hüseyin oğlu 
Ömer”, whose full record is presented in Section 3.6.1 above, it is seen that the 
amount of cuts imposed on him is 6.45 liras over a gross wage of 39 liras, which is 
equivalent to a 17 percent cut. This is below the general 20 percent and 24 percent 
calculated above. However, the deductions follow a ‘regressive’ pattern, that is, as 
the wage increased the percentage of the cuts decreased. In this context, it is 
meaningful to contrast the wage of Hüseyin Oğlu Ömer, which was cut with a rate 
of 17 percent with that of another worker, whose net wage was 37 percent below 
                                                          
150 Estimate based on the military tax collected in İktisad mine number 63 during October 1922: 
KÜA, no.194, p.28. 
151 Estimate based on the Hilal-i Ahmer aid colllected in İktisad mine number 63 during October 
1922: KÜA, no.194, p.28. 
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the gross one: Gross: 9.20; bread cut: 2.60; goods cut: 0.15; aid to disaster victims: 
1.50; net wage 5.85152. 
                                                          
152 KÜA, no.66. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ACCIDENTS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to workplace accidents that have taken place in the mines 
of the Zonguldak-Ereğli coal basin. Accidents occur in almost every industry, in 
this sense, no manual worker is exempt from risk. Yet, the working environment in 
coal mines was so unsafe -and was definitely so in the coal basin of the fin-de-
siécle Ottoman Empire- that the accidents in collieries seemed to be an ‘integral 
part’ of the production process. Beside this general feature of the coal mining 
accidents, studying accidents is important and necessary for the purposes of this 
thesis for a number of reasons. First of all, accidents mean great human suffering 
and an attention on the causes and consequences of this suffering requires no 
justification. Secondly, the frequency of accidents is a reliable indicator of the 
technical/physical conditions in the mines; any change in them would probably find 
its reflection in accidents. Thirdly, the measures taken or not taken by the mine 
operators against the occurring of accidents is an important indicator of their 
attitude towards their employees. Fourthly, the actions of state organs following the 
accidents may tell us a great deal about the official attitude and policies towards the 
workers in particular and the mines in general. Fifthly, the last two points are tied 
closely to the level of labour organisation, struggle and militancy. Last but not the 
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least, an accident is a tragic event not only for the miners who were directly 
involved but also for the working community as a whole. Thus, the reactions of the 
workers who have not been direct victims of grave accidents are worth considering, 
particularly in terms of the sense of solidarity among all workers. 
The above points constitute also a list of possible emphasises that could be 
done when studying the accidents. In this chapter, the emphasis will be on the 
general attitude of the state organs towards the accidents and the official reactions 
to particular accidents on the one hand and the workers’ reactions on the other. 
Both the frequency and the technical reasons of the accidents would be a required 
part of any inquiry into this subject, yet the primary sources that I have consulted 
are far from providing data comparable to, for instance, the registers used by 
Kahveci and Nichols for the accidents in the Republican era153. I will also refrain 
from discussing the health-related aspects of the accidents; indeed, a more or less 
comprehensive investigation of the health problems of workers should include 
many occupational diseases they suffer, such as lung diseases and nystagmus. 
I also limited the subject in terms of the time period. Although there are mentions 
of other periods as well, I have chosen to focus on a roughly six-period, extending 
from the last months of 1909 to the first months of 1910. This ‘choice’ can be 
justified in a number of ways. First, the nature of the sources. The registers that 
pertain to this period is more complete than those that pertain to other periods. 
Secondly, the years 1909 and 1910 are ‘meaningful’ ones, in that they belong to a 
period when the ancien régime had ended, but its features were still alive and even 
dominant in many respects. Thus, being the years of Revolution, they provide clues 
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for understanding the ancien régime as well. Thirdly, I am interested less in 
drawing a statistical picture based on long-term data and then to proceed to 
interpret it than to tell a more or less detailed ‘story’ of a certain limited period and 
make deductions that would hopefully be valid for longer periods of time. 
 
4.2 Accidents and Their Outcomes: 1909-1910 
The chain of fatal accidents, which would be followed here, began with the death 
of Receb of Cide, who was working in the mine of Herafim Efendi and Co. The 
incident was reported from the office of the mine administration in Kilimli region 
to the central office with a letter of 2 October 1909. The summary of the letter 
recorded in Evrak Defteri is as follows: 
Herafim Efendi ve şürekasının ocağı amelesinden Cideli Receb 
bundan bir kaç gün mukaddem hasta olub bugün müteessiren 
vefat ettiği ve kazazedenin Zonguldak'a nakledildiğine dair154 
 
What is significant here is that the contradictory terms hasta (literally sick, 
suggesting a 'natural' disease) and kazazede (victim of an accident) were used in the 
same sentence. 
Two days later, in the Çatalağzı region, around the Gelik mine of the Ereğli 
company, sapper Hasan and his mate, İlyas were lightly injured after fire came out 
from their lamps when passing a railway switch155. One day later, on 5 October 
1909, the Çatalağzı branch office demands that both the engine-drivers and the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
153 Theo Nichols and Erol Kahveci, “The Condition of Mine Labour in Turkey: Injuries to Miners in 
Zonguldak”, Middle Eastern Studies, 31(2), 1995, pp.197-228. 
154 KÜA, no.40, p.66 (19 Eylül 1325 / 2 October 1909). 
“ Among the workers of the mine of Herafim Efendi and Co., Receb of Cide had been sick for some 
days and today sadly died. The victim of the disaster was transported to Zonguldak.” 
155 KÜA, no.40, p.96 (21 Eylül 1325 / 4 October 1909). 
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Ereğli company should be warned in order to prevent the accidents in the 
railway156. 
On November 19th, 1909 the Çatalağzı office reported the death of the 
worker Sarrac Mehmed due to a falling stone from the ceiling in the Gelik mine of 
the French company157. This prompted the centre of the mine administration to 
order the Zonguldak office to go the place of incident, conduct an investigation and 
send the investigation report swiftly 158. In the very same day, the Çatalağzı office 
asks the centre the following question: A doctor has not yet come to examine Sarac 
Mehmed, who had died in Gelik. Should we authorise or not authorise the 
burial?159 In response, the centre decided to ask the question to Zonguldak 
Kaymakamlığı and forwarded the letter. On the second day of December, fire broke 
out in the Karadon mine of the company160. Although no death or injury reported, it 
is understood that an investigation was carried out by the Çatalağzı officials; a 
letter sent from Çatalağzı to the central office says that the pits in the Karadon was 
controlled and no dangerous situation was detected161. On the very same day, an 
official letter from the central office to Zonguldak Kaymakamlığı reports that a 
circular concerning the precautions against the accidents had been sent to the 
branch offices and the engineer's office as of 1 November 1909 and mentions a 
tezkire-i aliyye on the same subject issued on 30 Kasım 1909162. This is particularly 
important because not only the mine administration issues a circular on preventing 
the accidents but the Ministry of Mines is also involved and issues an order. This 
                                                          
156 KÜA, no.40, p.97 (22 Eylül 1325 / 5 October 1909). 
157 KÜA, no.40, p.102 (6 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 / 19 November 1909). 
158 KÜA, no.40, p.132 (7 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 / 20 November 1909). 
159 KÜA, no.40, p.102 (7 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 / 20 November 1909). 
160 KÜA, no.40, p.103 (19 Teşrin-i Sani 1325 / 2 December 1909). 
161 KÜA, no.40, p.103 (21Teşrin-i Sani 1325 / 4 December 1909). 
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shows that the accidents were taken seriously by both the administration and the 
ministry. 
An order sent from the centre to the Kozlu office is also worth mentioning 
here. In this letter, it is said that the mine operators shall build a hospital for the 
treatment of workers who would be injured in the mine accidents and if they would 
not do so, the mine administration would build one and all the costs would be paid 
by the mine operators themselves163. This is particularly significant; for the mine 
administration considers the construction of a hospital for the workers as a 
responsibility of the mine operators. On January 3rd, 1910, the centre also 
forwarded an order of the ministry about the precautionary measures to be taken in 
mines with firedamp164. This further depicts that, rather than leaving the sole 
responsibility to the miner administration, the ministry was involved in the problem 
of accidents. 
The third day of January marks the beginning of a set of tragic events for 
the workers and a set of highly interesting correspondence between the centre of 
the mine administration and the engineer's office. On January 3rd, 1910, it was 
reported that two workers had been injured in the Kaplu (?) mine and the worker 
Mehmed had been badly injured in Gelik, both of the mines belonging to the 
company165. On the very same day, another worker lost his life; sapper Veli 
Hüseyin died in Gelik166. A week later, the centre warned the engineer's office to 
conduct the investigation of the death of Veli Hüseyin rapidly167. Another letter 
                                                                                                                                                                 
162 KÜA, no.40, p.136 (21Teşrin-i Sani 1325 / 4 December 1909). 
163 KÜA, no.40, p.138 (6 Kanun-ı  Evvel 1325 / 27 December 1909). 
164 KÜA, no.40, p.139 (21 Kanun-ı  Evvel 1325 / 3 January 1910). 
165 KÜA, no.40, p.139 (21 Kanun-ı Evvel 1325 / 3 January 1910). 
166 KÜA, no.40, p.105 (21 Kanun-ı Evvel 1325 / 3 January 1910). 
167 KÜA, no.40, p.139 (28 Kanun-ı Evvel 1325 / 10 January 1910). 
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from the centre to the engineer's office was sent on 11 January. It informs the latter 
about the loss of life and injury in Çay seam without specification and demands a 
investigation and examination, emphasising the need to be swift168. On January 
14th, the centre attached a telegraph of the Zonguldak Office to the engineer's office 
and demanded that the accident in company's mine be investigated and the "health 
and life of the workers be ensured"169. 
Another worker died in Gelik, on 23 January 1910, due to a cave-in170. A 
worker lost his life in Çay seam the day after171. The telegraph of the central office 
to engineer's office sent on 25 January provides information about yet another 
accident. This time, the language sounded firmer and included a flavour of threat: 
Şirketin Gelik ocağında vefat eden amele hakkında Zonguldak 
memurluğunun telgrafı balaya yazıldı. Ocak vukuatı hakkındaki 
tebligattan bir şübhe hasıl olmadığından muceb-i mesuliyet 
olacak ahvale meydan verilmemesi ve netice-i tahkikatın ba-
rapor işarı hakkında172 
 
On 29th January, another letter was sent to engineer's office and this time demands 
an explicit answer: 
Ocaklardaki kazalar hakkındaki raporların 8 Kanun-ı Sani 325 
[21 January 1910] tarihli olduğu halde 16 Kanun-ı Sani 325'de 
[29 January 1910] gelmesine sebeb ne olduğunun ve emsali 
muamelenin bila-tehir işar ve irsaline dair cevaben173 
 
                                                          
168 KÜA, no.40, p.139 (29 Kanun-ı Evvel 1325 / 11 January 1910). 
169 KÜA, no.40, p.139 (1 Kanun-ı Sani 1325 / 14 January 1910). 
170 KÜA, no.40, p.105 (10 Kanun-ı Sani 1325 / 23 January 1910). 
171 KÜA, no.40, p.140 (11 Kanun-ı Sani 1325 / 24 January 1910). 
172 KÜA, no.40, p.140 (16 Kanun-ı Sani 1325 / 29 January 1910). 
“The telegraph of the Zonguldak office concerning the death of the worker in the Gelik mine of the 
company is written below. Since there is no doubt about the incident, no room for (legal) 
responsibility should be left and the outcome of investigation should be sent as a report.” 
173 KÜA, no.40, p.140 (16 Kanun-ı Sani 1325 / 29 January 1910). 
“Why were the reports about the accidents in the mines dated 21 January 1910 but received on 29 
January 1910? Similar correspondence should be sent without delay.” 
 67
Another accident occurred in Kozlu, in the mine of Şakir Bey and Cemal 
Bey and claimed the live of a worker. The central office called the engineer to the 
centre on February 1st174. 
On 21st February the chain of fatal accidents in Gelik mine of the Ereğli 
company continued: sapper Osman of Hamidiye lost his life, and worker Ahmed 
and sapper Nikola were injured175. This was the last event in a chain of accidents in 
Gelik. In this mine, which was operated by the French company, seven significant 
accidents had taken place within five months, claiming the lives of five workers 
and injuring another five of them. Things did not settle in Gelik: The workers went 
on strike on 25th February, four days after the last accident176. In a telegraph sent by 
the Çatalağzı office, it is reported that a sufficient number of workers and sappers 
started working177. This emphasis on 'sufficient number' suggests that some 
workers continued the strike. 
Unfortunately, there is no information about the fate and outcome of the 
strike in the pages of the Evrak Defteri of 1325 (1909-10). On the other hand, it is 
clear that it, along with the high frequency of accidents, alarmed the mine 
administration. In a telegraph to engineer's office, the central office wrote that: 
Zonguldak memurluğunun 594 numrolu telgrafı balaya yazıldı. 
Münderecatına göre mahallinde tedkikat icrasıyla raporunun 
yarın akşama kadar irsali ve terk-i eşgal meselesinde olduğu gibi 
bu hususda da istirahat-i zatiyenizi hayat-ı insaniyeye tercihle 
tekasül edilirse nezarete şikayet edileceğinize dair178 
 
                                                          
174 KÜA, no.40, p.141 (19 Kanun-ı Sani 1325 / 1 February 1910). 
175 KÜA, no.40, p.107 (8 Şubat 1325 / 21 February 1910). 
176 KÜA, no.40, p.107 (12 Şubat 1325 / 25 February 1910). 
177 KÜA, no.40, p.107 (13 Şubat 1325 / 26 February 1910). 
178 KÜA, no.40, p.142 (15 Şubat 1325 / 28 February 1910). 
“The telegraph no.594 of the Zonguldak office is written below. An examination in the place of 
incident should be carried out and the report should be sent until tomorrow evening; if you, as in the 
case of strike, prefer your personal comfort to human life, you will be reported to the ministry.” 
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This very harshly worded telegraph includes an order with a deadline: "until 
tomorrow evening"; an accusal: "preferring personal comfort to human life"; and a 
threat: "if not, a complaint about you will be issued to the ministry". 
The centre of the mine administration continued the correspondence on the 
Gelik strike on the first day of March. The summary of the memorandum sent to 
the Ereğli company reads: 
Gelik'de amelenin terk-i eşgaline tarafınızdan tenzil-i ücerat 
hakkında yazılmış bir tahrirat sebeb olduğu ve ay nihayetlerinde 
amelenin cezaen akçe tevkif ve ceza tertib ve çavuşlar tarafından 
anneye ve namusa küfür suretiyle tahkir ve ———— edilmekte 
olduğu kaymakamlığın tezkeresinden anlaşılıp nezarete 
yazıldığından meni hakkında179 
 
In the following days, the centre continued to send letters blaming the company 
and the engineer. On March 2nd, a letter was sent to the engineer's office, stating 
that the engineer's reports number 45 and 47 could not be accepted180. Three days 
later, this time the company received a letter in which the company, after a train 
went off the railway on the Üzülmez line and three people were injured, was held 
responsible for not employing a switchman in every switch181. Lastly, a letter was 
sent to the engineer's office, the summary of which reads as: 
Vazifenize mübaşeret tarihinden itibaren bu güne kadar ocak 
kazalarıyla bunlar hakkındaki tahkikatınız üzerine neticeyi mübin 
ne gibi tedabir ittihaz edilmiş ve bilumum madencilerin ameliyatı 
fenne muvafık mıdır değil midir ve bu babda ne gibi raporlar 
verilmistir beyan edilmesi ve izahat-ı lazımeyi havi olmak üzere 
mufassal bir defterinin nezarete li-ecli’l-takdim irsaline dair182 
                                                          
179 KÜA, no.40, p. 142 (16 Şubat 1325 / 1 March 1910). 
“It is understood from the memorandum of the lieutenant-governor (of Zonguldak) that the reason 
of the strike in Gelik was a letter written by the company about a reduction in the wages and that in 
the ends of months, money is cut from workers as fines and the foremen insult them by swearing 
against their mothers and chastity. These points were reported to the ministry and should be 
prevented.” 
180 KÜA, no.40, p.142 (17 Şubat 1325 / 2 March 1910). 
181 KÜA, no.40, p.142 (20 Şubat 1325 / 5 March 1910). 
182 KÜA, no.40, p.142 (21 Şubat 1325 / 6 March 1910). 
 69
 
This completes the chain of events and the set of correspondence that took place 
between the central office, various local branches, the engineer's office of the mine 
administration, Zonguldak Kaymakamlığı, the ministry, and the French company. 
In the following section, the accidents and the subsequent events and developments 
are discussed and interpreted.  
 
4.3 Responses and Reactions to Accidents 
At the time that has been considered here, the coal basin was under the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Forest and Mines. The ministry, indeed, took the 
accidents seriously and issues orders about the measures to be taken in order to 
prevent the accidents in the mines. On the other hand, it was not the ministry but 
the mine administration that was responsible for carrying out these measures. In a 
sense, the ministry’s responses were general and the mine administration dealt with 
particular cases. Thus, in this context, it is appropriate to start with mine 
administration and assume that it was representing the official side of the problem 
of accidents. 
 
4.3.1. Mine Administration 
If the actions of the mine administration are considered through the period 
constituted the focus here, what will most probably emerge is that it was really 
working and pressing hard to ensure the safety of the workers in the basin. In doing 
this, the centre of the mine administration warned the local offices about the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
“Since you started your duty, which result-delivering measures has been taken following your 
investigations into mine accidents? Are all mine owners’ operations scientifically sound, and which 
reports has been sent on this issue? A detailed register containing the necessary explanations should 
be sent in order to be presented to the ministry.”  
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precautionary measures against accidents. When an accident happened, it did not 
hesitate to accuse the company for failing to fulfil its obligations. It reacted swiftly 
to every accident and pressed the engineer’s office to complete the investigation 
process without delay. When the workers went on strike, rather than any agitators 
and provocateurs, it accused the company itself for inappropriate behaviour 
towards the workers. It urged the mine operators to build a hospital for the 
treatment of victims of the accidents. In short, in the context of the events described 
above, the centre of the mine administration consistently took the side of the 
workers against the French company and against the other mine owners. I will turn 
to this issue below. 
 
4.3.2 Engineer’s Office 
The correspondence described and discussed in this chapter clearly suggests that 
there was a growing tension between the centre of the mine administration and the 
engineer’s office. The former constantly urged the latter to be quick, set deadlines 
for the preparation of technical reports, asked for explanations in case of delay, and 
issued a complaint to the ministry.  The centre asked which measures were taken 
after the technical reports had been prepared in the pits in which accidents have 
taken place. The centre even accused the engineer’s office for neglecting human 
life. 
At first glance, this tension between the engineer’s office and the centre and 
the toughness of the latter suggests a personal dispute. Indeed, the wording of the 
letters of the centre of the administration implies that they were addressing not an 
official body, but one person. The memoirs of Hüseyin Fehmi (İmer), a former 
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director of the mine administration, also support such an idea; he says that there 
was only one engineer in the administration at the time of his assignment183. 
Therefore, it is plausible to see this dispute to be a personal one between the 
director and the engineer. Moreover, the pressure of the director on the engineer 
might be a consequence of the latter being too busy with the affairs of the whole 
basin. 
On the other hand, a closer look to the events may present a different 
picture. The centre’s insistence that the “health and life of the workers be ensured” 
and the fact that it asked the engineer whether all the operations of mine owners are 
scientific and proper suggests that the engineer was not fulfilling his job properly. 
Besides, how can the fact that a report on the accidents that had been completed on 
21 January 1910 was sent to the centre after an eight-day delay. It seems that the 
engineer was intentionally delaying the investigation processes after accidents. The 
only explanation to this could be that the engineer (or the engineer’s office as a 
whole) had ‘improper’ or illegal relationships with the French company and the 
other mine owners. Although there is no evidence to prove the validity of such 
reasoning, the correspondence shows, at least, that the centre (director) of the mine 
administration thought it to be so. 
 
                                                          
183 Kerim Yund (ed.), Şeçkin Türk Ormancısı Hüseyin Fehmi İmer Hayatı-Hatıraları 1871-1960 
(İstanbul: Baha, 1973), p.50. 
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4.3.3 The Ottoman State on Accidents: An Evaluation 
As discussed above, in the period that has been covered in this chapter, namely the 
last months of 1909 and first months of 1910, the Ottoman state seems to act 
always in favour of the workers. Yet, if we go a little further in time, the story of a 
worker, fireman İsmail can complicate the issue to an extent. In a 9 October 1910 
letter sent from the Amasra branch to the centre, it was written, “276 piasters 
should be cut from the due wage of injured İsmail in return for the examination and 
treatment costs”184. The subsequent correspondence185 shows that the 
administration was very keen on taking the money from İsmail that they even 
sought to employ him for just this purpose. Beneath these five letters lay a tragic 
story: The administration demanded İsmail, whose leg had been injured in a 
railway accident, to pay 276 piasters in return for medical costs by additional 
working, while the wage of a fireman was 8 piasters. 
Another complicating factor may be the attitude of the engineer. Above all, 
he was also a representative of the Ottoman state in the basin and his actions 
thereby could not be isolated from the official attitude regarding the workplace 
accidents. Moreover, it can also be argued that the favouring attitude of the mine 
administration towards the workers reflected less a concern in human life and 
health than a concern in increasing production and maintaining ‘law and order’ in 
the basin. 
I think that, rather than from the different personal tendencies of officials, 
these seemingly contradictory actions stemmed from the contradictory nature of the 
                                                          
184 KÜA, no.154, p.43 (26 Eylül 1326 / 9 October 1910). 
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Ottoman state. On the one hand, the Ottoman state around 1909-1910 was a 
revolutionary one. The revolution was accomplished in the name of the principles 
of “hürriyet, müsavat, uhuvvet” (liberty, equality, fraternity), which might have led 
the revolutionary regime to adopt a more favourable stance towards workers. On 
the other hand, the class character of the 1908 revolution should have played an 
opposite role. Its bourgeois nature should have imposed limits on the new regime’s 
favourable attitude towards the labour problem. Still, there was the need to 
establish ‘law and order’ and increase production in the basin. This need, 
depending on the context, might have given rise to both lines of action on the part 
of the state: either intervention in favour of labour, or the policy of ‘iron fist’. 
Lastly, as we have seen in the case of the engineer of the mine administration, 
corruption also played its part. 
 
4.3.4 The French Company and the Accidents 
In fact, the concession to exploit the Zonguldak-Ereğli coalmines given to French 
company represented a significant improvement in the region in terms of 
investment and technology. The French company undertook major infrastructural 
activity in the region including the Zonguldak port. Moreover, the French 
government was considering the company’s entrance into the basin as the 
establishment of a French colony at Zonguldak186. 
The investment of the company and the construction of railways by the 
Ottoman government rapidly increased production. It seems, however, that this 
                                                                                                                                                                 
185 KÜA, no.154, letters and telegraphs of dates 26 Eylül 1326 / 9 October 1910; 23 Teşrin-i Sani 
1326 / 6 December 1910; 5 Kanun-ı Evvel 1326 / 18 December 1910; 22 Kanun-ı Evvel 1326 / 4 
January 1911. 
186 Quataert, Disintegration, p.49. 
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‘modernisation’ in the basin did not mean any improvement in the working 
conditions. 15 years after the concession was granted, the frequency of accidents in 
the pits operated by the company is really astonishing. From November 1909 to 
February 1910, six serious accidents occurred in Gelik alone, killing five workers 
and injuring another five. Further, if we consider the memorandum of Zonguldak 
lieutenant-governor187 to be true, the company attempted to cut down wages, 
arbitrarily imposed fines on workers, and the foremen constantly insulted them. 
Thus, the condition of mineworkers working in the pits of the company seems not 
to be very different from that of the workers in other pits: highly unsafe working 
conditions, low wages and inhumanly treatment. 
 
4.3.5 The workers and the Accidents 
As evident from the correspondence discussed in Section 4.2 above, the workers of 
the Gelik mine, which belongs to the Ereğli company, went on strike on 25th 
February 1910, and at least some of them continued to strike the other day. The 
lieutenant-governor of Zonguldak and the mine administration thought that the 
strike was a result of the company’s attempt to cut down wages, arbitrary fines 
imposed on workers and the insulting treatment of the workers by the foremen and 
there was no mention about the accidents188. On the other hand, the strike followed 
a series of tragic accidents in which five workers had been killed and another five 
had been injured and the last of which had taken place four days before the strike. 
Thus, although the workers had other problems, it is very likely that the accidents 
also played their part in urging the workers of Gelik to strike. It seems that the 
                                                          
187 KÜA, no.40, p.142 (16 Şubat 1325 / 1 March 1910). 
188 See note 27 above. 
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workers found the frequency of accidents and the death toll unacceptable and 
reacted to them via striking. Apart from indicating the workers’ reaction to the 
accidents, this is also an indicator of the fact that striking has become a plausible 
method for struggle. 
What is more significant is that the workers of Gelik did not give up their 
struggles. In mid-1910 and late 1911, two more strikes were organised in this mine. 
This time, the factor behind the strikes was the low level of wages189.  
The militancy of the Gelik workers continued even during the World War I. 
According to Hüseyin Fehmi (İmer), in the evening of the day when Zonguldak 
was bombarded by the Russian army, a few hundred armed workers from Gelik 
mine moved to Zonguldak in order to attack the French company’s headquarters 
and this could only be prevented with force, with the declaration of martial law in 
the region190. This incident is particularly significant in that it shows the level of 
hatred among the Gelik workers towards the company.  
The workers of Gelik went on strike again in May 1922. According to the 
gendarme, the major reasons of this resistance were arbitrary deductions from 
wages, implausibly high fines, and the company’s insistence on not giving more 
than a piece of bread per worker191. 
Thus, the workers of Gelik mine emerged as highly militant ones in these 
years. The reasons behind this peculiar nature of workers of this mine are not 
definitely known. Perhaps a significant number of workers were concentrated in 
this mine, which facilitated the organisation of various forms of resistance. It is 
                                                          
189 Sina Çıladır, “Zonguldak Kömür Havzasında İşçi Hareketi ve Sendikacılık”, Türkiye 
Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı ve Tarih Vakfı, 1996), p.558. 
190 Yund, Hüseyin Fehmi İmer, p.54-5. 
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also plausible that the working conditions were especially hard in this mine; this 
possibility is supported by the high frequency of accidents. It may well be that 
certain forms of political activity carried out by some workers or by those the 
company named as ‘outside agitators’ induced the other workers to organise 
resistance. We are far from deciding which of these factors took part. In any case, 
however, it is evident that the workers of Gelik maintained a tradition of struggle 
and resistance over years. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
191 Çıladır, “İşçi Hareketi ve Sendikacılık”, p.558. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
The beginning and intensification of mining activity in the Ereğli-Zonguldak 
region brought about a great transformation in people’s lives. The agrarian 
population of the region constituted the backbone of the labour force employed in 
the mines and the basin attracted poor and wealthy emigrants from surrounding 
regions. People who were not directly linked to mining, most significantly the 
women, were also affected by this sea change. The dimensions of this 
transformation that occurred in the basin were well depicted in the development of 
Zonguldak itself. Zonguldak, which was only a small neighbourhood of a village at 
the time of the beginnings of mining activity, became a province in 1924. During 
this time, the basin remained a place in which many interesting events and trends 
could be observed: transformation of the agrarian community, rivalry between local 
and foreign capitalists, relations among workers, their struggles, state policies and 
so on. Here, it would be worthwhile to notice the reaction of Hüseyin Fehmi (İmer) 
when he was assigned as the director of the mines in 1910: “Why did you sacrifice 
me? Am I the only faulty one in this ministry? You sacrificed me to that chaotic 
place.”192 
                                                          
192 Kerim Yund (ed.), Seçkin Türk Ormancısı Hüseyin Fehmi İmer Hayatı Hatıraları (1871-1960) 
(İstanbul: Baha, 1973). 
 78
One of the focal points of this study is the wages in the basin. I chose the 
wages because they seem to be closely related to a number of factors, labour 
scarcity or abundance, the quality of life of workers, the level of labour 
organisation and militancy, to state a few. If a very broad statement about the 
wages in the basin should be made, it would be that, leaving aside the erosion that 
took place during the war years, the real wages presented a more or less stable 
pattern. On the other hand, the erosion of the war years was not evenly distributed. 
While the increase in the wages of some categories of workers, particularly the 
skilled ones, remained significantly below the increase in prices, some wages, 
particularly those of unskilled workers, could match or even surpass the rise in 
prices. The result was a convergence of wages of skilled and unskilled workers. I 
also attempted to understand the impact of the strikes of 1908 on the wages in the 
basin but my conclusion turned out to be that presently, we are far from putting 
forward a reliable judgement on this issue. 
As to deductions imposed on wages, there were various forms of deductions 
circa 1922 and the average percentage of them was 20 percent. Yet, to the 
detriment of workers who were less paid, the deductions followed a ‘regressive’ 
pattern. Another point that deserves mention here pertains to the Amele Birliği, the 
first social security institution in the basin. Although it has been argued that the 
realisation of this fund had to wait until 1923, I found out that that cuts were made 
for this fund as early as 1922. 
The second emphasis of this thesis is on the accidents in the mines. This 
part of the study concentrates on 1909-10 and it is possible to say that the high 
frequency of accidents persisted in this period and in the mines of the Ereğli 
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company as well. There were seven serious accidents within five months in 
only the Gelik mine of the company, killing five and injuring another five workers. 
In response to this, the centre of the mine administration accused the company for 
failing to take the necessary preventive measures and the engineer’s office for 
putting off its job. Indeed, it is highly likely that the engineer established some 
illegal or extra-legal relationships with the French company and with other mine 
operators. The government’s reaction probably reflected the ambivalent situation in 
which it found itself. Amidst various concerns, interests and pressures it could not 
take a consistent attitude towards the problem of accidents. As to the workers, who 
heavily suffered in these accidents, their response was in a form with which they 
seemed to be familiar at the time and which they would also employ in the future: 
striking. 
In this thesis, I tried to shed light on some aspects of the lives of the 
labourers of the Ereğli-Zonguldak coal basin during the Ottoman period and 
followed this up to the first years of the Kemalist government. Miserable 
conditions, poverty and fatal accidents were transferred to the Republican period. 
On the other hand, it seems that these workers also transferred their tradition of 
resistance and struggle to this new era. 
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Appendix 23: Ereğli ve Zonguldak Havzalarından İhraç Olunanacak Maden 
Kömürlerinden Alınacak İhracat Resmi Hakkında Kanun (15.08.1920; no.11) 
 
Madde 1: Ereğli ve Zonguldak havza-i fahmiyesinden çıkarılan kömürlerin füruht 
ve sevki hakkında mevzu kuyut refedilmiştir. 
 
Madde 2: Maden kömürlerinin yıkanmış cinsinin beher tonasından iskeleden hin-i 
ihracında muayyen olan rüsum-ı nisbiyeden maada maktuan üç lira ve yıkanmamış 
cinsinden iki lira ihracat resmi alınacaktır. Kömür fiatlarının tereffü veya tedennisi 
halinde işbu rüsum Heyet-i Vekile karariyle yüzde elliye kadar tezyit veya tenkis 
olunabilir. 
 
Madde 3: Komisyon namına beher ton kömürden istifa edilmekte olan on beş kuruş 
badema ahzedilmeyecek ve simdiye kadar alınmış olan mebaliğin hesabı 
Zonguldak muhasebesince rüyet edilerek bakiye-i mevcude mal sandığına 
devrolunacaktır. 
 
Madde 4: İşbu kanun tarih-i neşrinden itibaren meriülicradır. 
 
Madde 5: İşbu kanunun icra-yı ahkamına Müdafaa-i Milliye, İktisat ve Maliye 
Vekilleri memurdur. 
 
 
  
 
Appendix 24: Zonguldak ve Ereğli Havza-i Fahmiyesinde Mevcut Kömür 
Tozlarının Amele Menafi-i Umumiyesine Olarak Fürühtuna Dair Kanun 
(28.04.1921; no.114) 
 
Madde 1: Zonguldak ve Ereğli havza-i fahmiyesinde elyevm mevcut bulunan ve 
badema kömür istihsalatından vücuda gelecek olan maden kömür tozları maden 
amelesinin menafi-i umumiyesine hasr ü tahsis olunur. 
 
Madde 2: Maden kömürü tozları amele heyet-i idaresi tarafından İktisat Vekaletinin 
nezareti altında bilmüzayede satılır ve amele hayeti namına Ziraat Bankasına tevdi 
olunur. 
 
Madde 3: İşbu kanun tarih-i neşrinden muteberdir. 
 
Madde 4: İşbu kanunun icra-yı ahkamına İktisat Vekili memurdur. 
  
Appendix 25: Ereğli Havza-i Fahmiyesi Maden Amelesinin Hukukuna Müteallik 
Kanun (10.09.1921; no.151) 
 
Madde 1: Maden ocaklarında müstahdem amelenin beytutetleri ve temin-i istirahatleri 
için her ocak civarında İktisat Vekaletince tanzim edilen numunelerine tevfikan amele 
koğuşları ile hamam inşasına ocak amilleri mecburdur. 
Madde 2: Maden işlerinde amelenin cebren istihdamı ve angarye suretiyle herhangi bir 
işe sevki ve on sekiz yaşından dun olanların maden ocakları dahilinde istihdamı 
memnudur. 
Madde 3: Her madenci istihdam ettiği amelenin miktar-ı ücretiyle künyesini mübeyyin 
numunesine tevfikan muntazam defter tutmağa ve bu defteri Amele Birliği müfettişine 
ve İktisat Vekaleti memurlarına beray-ı tetkik ibraza mecburdur. 
Madde 4: Alelumum madenciler tarafından nizamname-i mahsusuna tevfikan amele 
tarafından teşkil olunanacak ihtiyat ve teavün sandıklarına beher mah zarfında istihdam 
edecekleri amele ücürat-ı umumiyesinin yüzde birinden dun olmamak üzere muavenet-
i nakdiyede bulunmağa mecburdurlar. 
Madde 5: Amelenin zatına ait olup esna-yı ameliyatta kırılan alet ve edevat ile nakliyat 
esnasında telef olan hayvanatı madenci tarafında tamir ve tazmin olunur. 
Madde 6: Bilumum madenciler hasta ve kazazede olan ameleyi meccanen tedavi 
ettirmeğe ve bunu teminen maden civarında hastahane, eczahane ve şahadetnameli 
etibba bulundurmağa mecburdurlar. Bunların tayin-i mahal ve adediyle muhtelif 
madencilerin arasında mesarifin vech-i tevzi ve itasına dair ayrıca bir nizamname 
tanzim olunacaktır. 
Madde 7: Havza-i fahmiyede say ü amelden dolayı kazazede olanlarla vefat edenlerin 
varisleri veya amele müfettişliği veyahut İktisat Vekaleti taraflarından tazminat davası 
  
ikame olunur. İşbu tazminat davası miktarı kaç kuruştan ibaret olursa olsun sulh 
hakimleri hakkındaki kanuna tevfikan sulh mahkemelerince kabil-i temyiz olmak üzere 
rüyet olunur. Tazminat miktarı tarafeynden alelusul müntehap erbab-ı vukuftan 
teşekkül edecek heyetin vereceği rapora istinad eder. Kaza vukuu amil veya 
mültezimlerin sui idaresinden veya fennen ifası lazım gelen hususatın adem-i ifasından 
neşet etmişse tazminattan maada işbu amil veya mültezimlerden beş yüz liradan beş 
bin liraya kadar ceza-i nakdi alınır. 
Madde 8: Mesai-i yevmiye alelıtlak sekiz saattir, bu müddetten fazla çalışmağa hiçbir 
işçi icbar edilemez. Tahtezzemin mesafede nüzul ve suut için geçen müddet sekiz saate 
dahildir. 
Madde 9: Amelenin ahval-i sıhhiye ve şerait-i hayatiyeleriyle hukuk-ı umumiyelerine 
müteallik işbu mevaddı ifa etmeyen madenci ve mültezimlerin ruhsatname ve şartname 
ve itilafname ve imtiyazları fesh olunur. 
Madde 10: İşbu kanun ahkamı elyevm meri olan bilumum ruhsatname ve şartname ve 
itilafname ve imtiyazlara şamildir. 
Madde 11: Maden ocaklarında çalışan amelenin hadd-i asgari ücreti ocak amil veya 
mültezimleriyle Amele Birliği ve İktisat Vekaleti tarafında müntehap üç zat marifetiyle 
tayin olunur. 
Madde 12: Maden Nizamnamesinin 77’nci ve 78’nci maddeleriyle işbu kanun 
ahkamına tearuz eden alelumum mevadd-ı nizamiye mülgadır. 
Madde 13: Maden ocağı amilleri bir mescid ve genç ameleye gece dersleri vermek 
üzere bir mektep yapmağa ve muallim tutmağa mecburdurlar. 
Madde 14: İşbu kanun tarih-i neşrinden muteberdir. 
Madde 15: İşbu kanunun icrasına Adliye ve İktisat Vekilleri memurdur. 
